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Abstract
“Democratic transition,” the act of becoming democratic, and “democratic
consolidation,” the subsequent actions that solidify the achievement of becoming democratic, are
two separate processes that go hand in hand. While several Arab Spring nations overthrew their
dictators, fewer underwent a democratic transition, and only one – Tunisia – achieved
democratic consolidation (Bouchlaghem and Thepaut, 2019; Sadiki, 2019; Gianni, 2019).
Tunisia constitutes the sole Arab Spring country to have: 1) created and adopted a new
constitution; 2) formed and institutionalized political parties that peacefully share power; and 3)
achieved multiple rounds of free and fair elections (Al-Anani, 2014; Yerkes, 2019). Scholarly
consensus credits Tunisia’s civil society, a presence which predates the Arab Spring, with the
nation’s successful democratization (Boose, 2013; Yerkes, 2019; Giani, 2019).
Despite the clear benefits of its vibrant civil society, Tunisia’s democratic transition and
subsequent democratic consolidation were not without challenges. Some of these challenges
have been resolved, while others represent serious ongoing factors that must continue to be
managed (Chabkoun, 2015). Thus, an examination into Tunisia’s transition to democracy
suggests that the scholarly consensus that a vibrant civil society has a uniformly positive
influence on democratization lacks nuance, and if ignored in Tunisia’s future policymaking,
threatens to derail Tunisia’s democratic gains.
In order to understand the full impact of civil society organizations have on the Tunisian
democratic process, I chose to delineate my research project into three distinct units – each unit
becoming its own chapter in my dissertation. The first article provides an extensive scholarly
overview of the role of civil society in Tunisia, grappling with the oftentimes self-contradictory
nature of civil society activity in Tunisia. The second article is a qualitative analysis of the

collected data that contributed to my development of the central research question. The third
article contains contextualizes these paradoxical tendencies of Tunisian civil society, and their
associated contradictory results, employing Advocacy Coalition Framework as a lens through
which to view Tunisia’s current public policy environment. Overall, the empirical and theoretical
contribution of this dissertation will address a critical gap in the scholarly literature about the
impact of civil society organizations in post-revolution Tunisia. My research will also advance
the use of Advocacy Coalition Framework in future scholarship by delivering a comprehensive
study of Tunisia, which future scholars may use as a basis for new comparative case study work
and providing a model for the application of Advocacy Coalition Framework to other newly
formed democracies.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
Research Overview

The Arab Spring revolutions that swept the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 began
in Tunisia. Studying the regional aftermath of the Arab Spring reveals that Tunisia was not only
instigator of this regional wave of social movements, but also the first to overthrow its dictator. It
was also the only Arab Spring nation to successfully realize democratic consolidation. Following
the ouster of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 2011, civil society organizations (CSOs) in
Tunisia played a critical role in consolidating the transition to democracy. This central role of
CSOs gained international attention with the awarding of the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize to the
Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, a group of four CSOs that represent various interests in
Tunisian society.
The process of forming strong civil society organizations did not occur at random;
Tunisia established the Higher Authority for Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution,
Political Reform and Democratic Transition in March, 2011. It was tasked with leading the
nation and making necessary policy to further the democratic project until the first government
could be elected. The interim institution created a number of new decrees to promote democracy,
which were later passed into law by a majority vote in the Constituent Assembly once it was
seated (Mir, 2012). One of the decrees passed by the Higher Authority for Realization of the
Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition on September 24 th,
2011 relates to civil society: Decree Number 88, which includes multiple provisions for the
regulation of civil society organizations. Because members of the interim government were
aware of the importance of civil society in consolidating the democratic process, they prioritized
writing legislation to govern CSOs, including a number of modifications to existing CSO policy
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(Ben Hassine, 2018). Among the new policies established by Decree Number 88, important
changes include switching the regulation of CSOs from the Ministry of Interior to the General
Secretariat of the Prime Ministry, establishing rules for financial reporting, and allowing more
flexibility for groups seeking to start new organizations in order to encourage civil society
activity (Ben Ltaif, 2012).
Decree Number 88 also impacted the way that civil society organizations receive
authorization to operate. In the previous version, Law Number 154 of 1959, new organizations
would have to apply with the government for an authorization to operate. Upon receipt of this
request, the Ministry of Interior would review the application and decide whether to grant
authorization. Under Decree Number 88, there is no longer a requirement to obtain prior
authorization. Instead, the application process now merely serves as a reporting mechanism to
declare the CSO’s existence and intent to operate. This change is significant because it removed
one of the main tools of government monitoring and control.
Several issues were tied to the new legislation from the outset, beginning with a lack of
an institutional structure capable of handling the implementation process. Possible regulatory
components of Decree Number 88 were kept off of the National Constituent Assembly’s agenda
for various reasons. First, the topic of CSO regulation was politically sensitive because it was
linked to civil liberties. Many CSOs were formed to promote liberal democratic ideals with
missions that include advocating for freedom of speech, freedom of the press, various human
rights issues, and monitoring the work of political parties. When the decree was up for a vote of
approval in the National Constituent Assembly, most assembly members were planning to run
for office again in the next round of parliamentary elections (Deane, 2013). Any revision to
Decree Number 88 that might suggest an attempt to stifle CSO activity could appear to be a
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political power grab, or at the very least, appear to be undemocratic. Therefore, assembly
members who proposed changes to the revolutionary law, even for the purpose of preventing
corruption or misuse of CSOs, could harm their own political ambitions (Marks, 2014). Second,
the remaining elite structure from the old regime benefitted from this law; it gave them the
flexibility to form new organizations, use them for political gain, as well giving them the ability
to reconstruct and organize their old contacts. Third, the major political parties began relying on
CSOs to act as intermediaries in order to receive donations from foreign sources, since direct
foreign funding of political parties and campaigns is illegal (Lotita and Magnus, 2014). Finally,
several national and international factors consider a successful democratic system a great threat,
and those who seek to undermine democracy have found that they can use CSOs toward this end
by starting fanatical groups that are easily manipulated to threaten the democratic process
(Marks, 2014).
To be able to examine the contradictory impact of civil society organizations on the
Tunisian democratic process, I conduct an extensive research examining the impact of civil
society organizations in post-revolution countries. The deep understanding of the positive and
negative consequences of CSO activity will fill a gap in academia’s current understanding of
civil society organizations. Parallel to this, I also examine the counterintuitive stasis of the
existing Tunisian legislation that regulates and oversees CSO activity, applying Advocacy
Coalition Framework to frame the phenomena of policy change, learning, and coalitions that
have the potential to bring about reform. Being the first research to be done on Tunisia using
ACF, the findings of this dissertation will contribute to the development of the theory as well as
provide broader understanding of common policy-related themes.1

1

Exchange of emails with Dr. Christopher Weible on 11 February 2020.
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I use the World Bank’s definition of civil society organizations as “the wide array
of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life,
expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural,
political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil society organizations
therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based
organizations, professional associations, and foundations” (World Bank, 2013).

Introducing the Articles

Article 1: Civil Society Organizations and Democratic Transition in Tunisia. In the post-

authoritarian era, the new Tunisian policy makers intentionally looked to established
democracies such as the United States and western European nations as models for their new
political system (Zoubir, 2015). This led to ideas on how to frame the new constitution and
organize the country’s new governing bodies It also led to a recognition of the importance of a
strong role for civil society organizations (CSOs) in bolstering democracy (Deane, 2018). At the
same time, however, this reliance on European and American laws overlooked the fact that
progressive western law is the result of years of incrementalism in public policymaking, as well
as years of public discourse and cultural acclimatization to the liberal order of these policies.
One of the specific policy areas that the new government prioritized was to promote the
role of civil society in Tunisian democracy (Boose, 2013). Modeling new policy regulating civil
society on western examples, with the accompanying benefits and drawbacks of doing so,
Tunisian policymakers sought to foster civil society as a means of promoting democracy. Decree
Number 88 of 2011 emerged as the comprehensive law that enumerated many privileges and
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limitations for civil society organizations. While the decree did set rules to track and regulate the
financing of CSOs, it placed emphasis on creating CSOs by establishing low barriers to entry for
new CSOs. Since the establishment of Decree Number 88, an average of 1,600 new
organizations have been formed each year, resulting in the creation of more than 13,000 new
CSOs since 2011 (IFEDA, 2020).
This research will be useful to Tunisian policymakers, CSO stakeholders, and
international partners that seek to understand the role of CSOs in any democratizing society.
Scholars of democratization will be interested in this research because it will address gaps that
exist in the body of literature that deals with civil society. In particular, this research provides a
more robust analysis of both the positive and negative effects of civil society, as well as the
impact of how civil society is regulated. Ultimately, this article will provide recommendations to
policy makers.
Article 2: Qualitative Data Analysis. The initial data collection stage started in 2016 and

continued to 2020. Within this period, I conducted 15 personal interviews and collected relevant
public statements made by policy makers in reference to civil society organizations. From the
outset, I designed my specific list of questions around a consolidated list of relevant themes
including the relationship between CSOs and democracy, Decree Number 88 itself, and the
reasons behind CSOs’ compliance (or non-compliance) with existing laws and regulations. The
logic behind my thematic approach to qualitative design is to access an understanding of
participants’ views on the specific topics and to assess their general sentiments regarding CSOs,
as well as how connected they are to maintaining an environment in which CSOs can thrive.
This methodological design is compatible with the use of grounded analysis, which is
generally defined by its technique of categorizing the data into common themes, followed by
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establishing correlations between those themes and their ancillary motifs – both referred to as
“codes” – then narrowing the coded themes into to itemized categories, and finally, selecting the
core category that will form the research question. This multi-level process resulted in the
development of the main hypotheses and laid the groundwork for the rest of the research.
The results should be useful to Tunisian policymakers, CSO stakeholders, and
international governments that seek to understand the role of CSOs in democratizing societies.
Scholars of democratization will be interested in this research because it will address gaps that
exist in the body of literature that deals with civil society, and theoretical methodologists can
learn from this new application of Advocacy Coalition Framework. Finally, this research
presents findings that are useful beyond academia, providing a model for how to marshal
political and civic support to move CSO regulation in Tunisia beyond stasis, thus improving the
positive–negative balance of civil society’s effects – or possibly eradicating the negative
externalities associated with CSO activity altogether.
Article 3: Theoretical Framework. The Higher Authority for Realization of the Objectives

of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition passed several transitional decree
laws to strengthen the democratic process. Many of these laws were modeled after established
democracies and provided a new range of freedoms that did not exist before; Decree Number 88,
the new legislation regulating civil society organizations, is a primary example. Even though the
new law was highly progressive and provided the flexibility to establish thousands of new
organizations, many problems were associated with it. While conducting an extensive analysis
on the role of CSOs in Tunisia, Decree Number 88 was the common denominator between the
positive and the negative impact CSOs have on the Tunisian democratic transition. Using
Advocacy Coalition Framework, I conduct a policy analysis of this decree to explain both policy
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stasis and policy change. ACF proves to be a fruitful analytic tool when applied to the case of
Tunisia’s post-democratization legislation of Decree Number 88. The analysis of Decree Number
88 as a piece of transitional legislation reveals that Tunisian policymakers hold strong positive
beliefs about civil society broadly. Furthermore, the free, unfettered operation of CSOs is
extolled by many as being necessary for healthy civil society and, by extension, healthy
democracy. Since support for Decree Number 88 is considered to be a reflection of a “deep core
belief,” recommending any change to policy makers will be highly challenging from the start.
Viewed through the lens of ACF, and supported by qualitative data gleaned from this
study, any changes to Decree Number 88 aimed at remedying the negative effects of CSOs
should focus primarily on the implementation of the decree. Understanding the prevalent view of
equating CSO operation with democratic success to be a deep core belief should inform any
strategy to bring reform to civil society activities. Therefore, when policymakers establish
coalitions with CSO leaders who hold the same or similar ideologies, they can leverage the
shared ground to translate these immutable belief systems into viable policy initiatives. The
proposed policies should complement existing sections of Decree Number 88 and provide clear
implementation mechanisms that can solve the existing institutional conflict.

Structural Rationale

The three articles that follow each address the impact of civil society organizations on
Tunisia’s democratization, but are tied by the common thread of Decree Number 88’s impact as
regulatory public policy that applies to the domain of civil society organizations in Tunisia. In
sum, this dissertation project evaluates the effectiveness of Decree Number 88 as well as other de
facto attempts to promote and/or control civil society.
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Like tesserae, the miniature stones that make up a grand mosaic, the components of
Tunisia’s relationship between civil society and democratic consolidation presented in the three
articles are sufficiently distinct as to warrant a stand-alone article for each – yet collectively,
Articles 1, 2, and 3 comprise a cohesive depiction that cannot be realized alone. The Virgil
Mosaic, from Phoenician Carthage in what is the heart of modern Tunis, depicts a portrait of
Virgil, holding lines from his Aeneid, flanked by Clio and Melpomene, the Roman muses of
history and tragedy, respectively.

Figure 1.1: Virgil Mosaic, Bardo National Museum, Tunis, Tunisia.
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CHAPTER 2: The Contradictory Impact of Civil Society Organizations
Introduction

The present chapter examines the existing literature published by academics, researchers,
national and international organizations, the United Nations and other development agencies,
reports, and books related to the civil society in Tunisia. The first section of this chapter will
discuss civil society organizations and their impact on the Tunisian democratic process,
following a logical progression of three parts. First, I introduce the concept of civil society and
track the correlation between civil society organizations and democratization from a comparative
politics perspective; this part includes a review of civil society literature that focuses on the
theory of democratic consolidation in post-Arab Spring Countries.
In the second part of this chapter, I lay a foundation for the Tunisian case by analyzing
the dynamics of civil society that are particular to the case of Tunisia. Then I proceed to an
assessment of Decree Number 88’s impact on the regulation of civil society organizations in
Tunisia. I include an examination of the existing decree and an analysis of the regulations
associated with it, to explain the limits of the decree and the implications of the lack of effective
implementation.
Third, I explain the positive and negative impacts of CSOs on democratization in Tunisia
and analyze its progress since 2011. Within this section, I examine previous public policy and
political science studies that discussed the contradictory role of civil society organizations. I also
discuss the positive role CSOs has been playing in consolidating the Tunisian democratic
process, present its negative sides and the challenges it brought to Tunisian policy makers, and
present my conclusion and provide a list of recommendations.
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Hypothesis

The central hypothesis presented in this article is that civil society organizations are
playing a contradictory role in the Tunisian democratic process. On the one hand, CSOs provide
social structure and institutional stability that is beneficial for democratic governance, and these
positive effects on democracy are well documented. (Putnam, 2002; Beshara, 2002). On the
other hand, when civil society organizations are allowed free range to operate without regulatory
oversight, a “wild west” of CSOs can result – leading to a situation where the organizational
power and ability to funnel money into virtually any cause creates an opening for exploitation for
ill use, from the funding of terrorism to the illicit funding of political campaigns (Alzubairi,
2019). To test this hypothesis, I examine previous literature that deals with the positive impact
CSOs played in consolidating the Tunisian democratic process, and then add to these earlier
findings by applying recent research on Tunisia, as well as recent news articles produced in
Arabic, French, and English. I also conduct personal interviews and ethnographic observations.
Although there is a dearth of literature representing the opposing argument, I also present the
extant literature that deals with the negative implications of civil society organizations and apply
these findings to the Tunisian case.
In my view, this full understanding of CSO’s impacts – acknowledgement of both their
positive as well as their negative aspects – will serve the important role of filling a gap in our
current understanding of civil society organizations.

The Relationship Between CSOs and Democratization

Since 2011, the political situation in Tunisia has been in flux, but has generally moved
toward greater political stability and democratic consolidation. After the fall of the Ben Ali
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regime, the Tunisian government as well as the international community understood that this
novice democracy risked suffering from democratic backsliding, and that local and international
support is much needed to consolidate the process. Where many political parties, local
organizations, and government institutions needed capacity building, many international
organizations were ready to fill the gaps. Decree Number 88 came as an emergency decree to
open the door for the local and international communities to freely operate and overcome the
restrictions imposed by the previous regime. As a result, thousands of new organizations were
established after passage of Decree Number 88, many of them playing a direct role in monitoring
the democratic transition.
The country successfully underwent six rounds of democratic elections and the seating of
eleven different governments between October 2011 and December 2019. Throughout all of
these transitions, CSOs played a critical role in maintaining national stability and in promoting
democratic consolidation during the political transformation. An examination of the historical
background is needed in order to understand the swift adaptation Tunisian CSOs had to the
democratic transition.

Historical Background

An analysis of the historical development of civil society organizations is needed to
understand the role CSOs have been playing in the Tunisian democratic transition. Under the
jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire, Tunisia was the first country in the region to abolish slavery
(1846), adopt a Bill of Rights (1857), and adopt a written constitution (1861) (Boubakri, 2014).
Over time these moves, all progressive for the era in which they occurred, resulted in the creation
of an educated elite that would continue to play a major role in Tunisian politics until today.
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Under the French Colonialism, civic activism improved via “the importation of liberal French
values, and increase of political activism, through movements against occupation” (Baker, 2015,
p.26).
The struggle against French colonialism resulted in the birth of the strongest labor union
in Tunisia, the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), which is still playing an important
role in consolidating the Tunisian democratic process. The General Union of Tunisian Workers
leaders fought hand in hand with Tunisia’s first president Habib Bourguiba, and successfully
pushed the French out of the country in 1956. The Union continued to fight for a liberal order,
even standing against Bourguiba’s and then, later on, Ben Ali’s autocratic regimes. The General
Union of Tunisian Workers organized general strikes in 1978, 1984, 2008, and 2010 and
frequently succeeded in pushing the government to accept some of its demands (Deane, 2013).
After the coup of 1987, Ben Ali saw in civil society a great threat and worked on weakening the
influence of CSOs. However, the approach he adopted to strengthen the economic development
of the country obliged him to embrace certain international norms – namely, the Washington
Consensus’s economic liberalism and attached requirements to conform to western notions of
human, political, and civil rights. The Barcelona Process, which began as talks between
European, Middle Eastern and North African countries in 1995, is emblematic of this. The
resulting agreement from the Barcelona Process, called the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,
pushed Ben Ali to commit to several political, security, economic, social and cultural reforms
(Deane, 2013).
Even though Ben Ali agreed in theory to these developments, he was cautious when
setting up a this more liberal order. For instance, he maintained watch and even the ability to
exercise control over civil society activity and NGOs, while also establishing government-
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controlled organizations to compete with international organizations for internationally funded
aid and foreign direct investment. This approach, referred to as “authoritarian resilience,”
allowed Ben Ali to comply with international requirements for liberal, non-authoritarian
practices while simultaneously maintaining significant control of the country (Arts and
Cavatorta, 2013).
Regardless of the restrictions on civil society, CSOs, and NGOs imposed by the prerevolution governments, civil society organizations still managed to play an important role in
strengthening Tunisian freedoms. Some milestone achievements ushered in by Tunisia’s civil
society included the Personal Status Code established by Bourguiba in 1956, which was the
backbone of gender equality: it abolished polygamy, required personal consent of both spouses
before marriage, gave women the right to legally divorce and recognized inheritance rights,
legalized abortion, and introduced mandatory education to both genders (Joseph, 2018). This law
resulted the creation of several organizations such as the Tunisian Human Rights League (1976)
and the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (1989) which continue to exist to present
the day. Even longstanding organizations that once served to sustain the dictatorships of
Bourgiba and Ben Ali – such as the Tunisian General Labor Union (established in 1946), the
Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts (established in 1947), the Tunisian
Human Rights League (established in 1976), and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers (established in
1958) – played a pivotal role in pro-democratic consensus building in the early stages of
democratic transition after Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution. Many credit these particular four
organizations, known as the Tunisian Dialogue Quartet, with saving the country from bloodshed
and rescuing the Tunisian democratic experiment from imminent failure by establishing a
national dialogue. This dialogue led to compromise and a consensus-based governance, replacing
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the Islamic-led government by a technocratic one after the revolution (Martin, 2015). For this,
the Dialogue Quartet was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015.

The Chronological Order of Legislation
Tunisia’s history with civil society organization dates back to its gaining independence
from France in 1956. Even though the first Tunisian president, Habib Bourgiba, spent most of his
political career opposing the French and was imprisoned by them for many years, he was
impressed by their legal system and based Tunisian institutions and its founding legislation on
the French system, drawing from the constitutions of France’s Fourth and Fifth Republics.
The policies and regulations associated with civil society organizations were first
introduced with Law Number 154 of 1959. Bourguiba valued the concept of “citizenship” and
argued that citizens should participate in building the country through volunteerism and civic
activism (Mnasri, 2018). Several years after independence, Bourgiba stated that the Tunisian
society is not ready for a full democracy yet, paving the way for his future pronouncement
proclaiming himself president for life. At the same time of this announcement in 1975, Bourgiba
also imposed several restrictions on establishing new organizations. One consequential example
of these new restrictions was the creation of eight associational categories that limited the
activities of organizations to cultural, educational, youth, development, sport, scientific, women,
and citizenship (Fortier, 2019).
The restrictions in 1975 came after Tunisia had agreed to give civil society organizations
more flexibility in 1969 by endorsing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
proposed by the United Nations General Assembly three years earlier, in December 1966. This
allowed the establishment of new civil society organizations such as the Tunisian Human Rights
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League. The piece of Tunisian legislation that was created to regulate CSOs was Law Number 80
of 1993; this law was created to allow international non-government organizations (NGOs) to
operate in Tunisia. (Mnasri, 2018).
Following the 2010-2011 uprising, the interim government established the Higher
Authority for Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform, and Democratic
Transition. This new institution had the jurisdiction to establish and amend legislation written for
the purpose of consolidating the democratic process and strengthening democratic institutions,
such as the assurance of free and fair elections. One of the first pieces of legislation introduced
during this period was Decree Number 88 of 2011, which discarded the restrictions imposed by
previous policy, and facilitated the establishment of new organizations. The main changes
provided by the new law were to cancel the associational classification system; switch the
jurisdictional control of CSOs from the Ministry of Interior to the Secretary General of the
Government; and to include international organizations in the law so that they, too, would be
subject to executive oversight. Table 1, below, compares the main differences between Law
Number 154 of 1959 and Decree Number 88 of 2011. As the table shows, Decree Number 88
requires the government to approve announce it approval of the CSO’s creation in a shorter
period of time than was the case under Law Number 154. It also removes the requirement that
CSOs belong to one of eight specific categories and provides CSOs greater flexibility in terms of
their membership.
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Table 2.1: A Comparison of the Components of Tunisia’s Laws of Association
Policies

Law Number 154 of 1959

Decree Number 88 of 2011

Source of law’s

Declaration of association

Declaration made to the secretary-

declaration

made to the Ministry of the

general of the government

Interior
Deadlines for

The Ministry of Interior could

The prime minister has 30 days to

acceptance of

reserve up to three months to

announce the acceptance of the

CSOs’ creation

announce the acceptance of the

creation of the association.

creation of the association
Associational

The law provided eight

There is no classification or limitation

categories of CSOs

associational categories and

for the field of intervention of the

applies limits to their field of

association.

intervention
CSO membership

The associations falling under

The association itself is permitted to

criteria

the rubric of “general”

establish criteria for membership

character were not permitted to
refuse any demand for
membership; if so, they could
be pursued juristically
Age limit for

No age limit for the founders or

Individuals under the age of 16 cannot

CSOs’ members

members of the association

establish/found an organization, and
members have to be at least the age of
13

Nationality

Implicitly, associations could

Associations can be created and

requirements for

only be constituted by

constituted by Tunisian Nationals or

CSO creation

Tunisians (as the state demands

Residents of Tunisia

the national identity card to
open a new application for
associational status
Source: Adapted from Fortier (2019, p.110)
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Civil Society and Democracy
The influence of Tunisia’s civil society organizations corroborates scholarly conventional
wisdom on the positive relationship between civil society and democracy, as this argument has
been a fixture in the ongoing discussion among democratization scholars (e.g., Huntington, 1998;
Abderrahmen, 2004; Zakaria, 2011; also see Berman, 1997 for opposing viewpoint). However,
the role of civil society in advancing democracy in the Middle East and North Africa is a
relatively recent avenue for this discussion, which only emerged in the last nine years because of
the Arab Spring.
Democratization literature flourished right after the end of the Cold War. Many scholars
such as Robert Putnam (2002), Larry Diamond (1997), and Francis Fukuyama (2014) argued that
that the waves of democratization which occurred after the Cold War were sustained by the
presence of a strong civic engagement. Other scholars such as Azmi Bchara (2012) and Shelly
Deane (2013) argue that the Arab Spring replicates the post-cold war pattern of democratization
with high levels of civic engagement and a strong presence of active civil society.
In the Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Samuel Huntington
(1993) discussed how the wave of democratization in eastern Europe during the late 1980s and
1990s affected the stability of Eastern Europe and why that wave is considered one of the most
important in the history of democratization. He argues that this political trend might extend to a
number of other countries, which raised the question among other scholars as to why this
movement did not reach Arab countries (Huntington, 1993). Before the Arab Spring, many
scholars contemplated the reasons behind the lack of democracy in the Arab world; scholars such
as Nathan Brown (2010), Nader Hashemi (2013), and Samira Shackle (2014) point to reasons
like Islam or argue in favor of economic explanations like rentier state theory, and still others
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tried to link it to the absence of civil society organizations in these countries. The Arab Spring
brought many of these theories to question, however, when after nearly a decade, Tunisia stands
as the sole example of successful democratic consolidation following the revolutions in the
region. This outcome is consistent with the scholarly argument that Tunisia’s robust civil society
is the main reasons behind the success.
In “Democratization and Civil Society: Libya, Tunisia and the Arab Spring,” Jason
William Boose (2013) analyzes the importance of civil society in building democracy. He
focuses on previous studies that deal with democratization, showing that democracy in the
Middle East is dependent upon a strong civil society. At the same time, he illustrates that the
Arab Spring is, in fact, part of Huntington’s Third Wave of Democratization. Boose presents case
studies to show how civil society played a major role in supporting the democratic process in
Latin American countries, and then relates this to the Middle East and North Africa, arguing that
Arab Spring countries are going through the same process (Boose, 2013).
Putnam (2002) argues that countries with a common context have an increase chance of
social tolerance. In the case of Tunisia, civic engagement was united behind the revolution,
which brought Islamists, seculars, unions, and liberals all together for a common goal. The 2011
revolution created a “social capital” that ignored its ideological differences and united to against
the incumbent regime. This unity led to a voluntary civic engagement, which became a training
ground for all kind of association during the transition period (Deane, 2013).
Azmi Beshara emphasizes that democracy can only exist with constant collaboration with
active civil society organizations. He gives the example of Iraq in 2003, where civil society
dramatically collapsed due to the absence of a functioning government (Beshara, 2012). Beshara
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states that civil society is considered “out of context if it doesn’t take part of the political struggle
to achieve democracy” (Beshara, 2012, p.37).
Tunisia’s civil society organizations such as the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT)
and the Tunisian League of Human Rights (LTDH) played crucial roles during the revolution.
Both organizations initiated national strikes, supported protests all over the country, and involved
social class activists and political elite (Honwana, 2013). Soon after Ben Ali fled the country,
transitional authorities created the Higher Authority for the Realization of the Objectives of the
Revolution, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition. This institution was composed of
several civil society organizations, unions, and experts and served as the interim transitional
legislative institution (Lust, 2014).
Tunisia is unique among the Arab Spring nations because it had a vibrant civil society
prior to revolution, largely because international aid from the UN agencies, The World Bank,
European Union, and even independent nations often came with the requirement that the regime
allow civil society organizations to function. The trend of CSO-friendly policies as a prerequisite
for foreign investment continued after the revolution, so civil society organizations found
national and international support in post-revolution Tunisia where the new government did not
have a choice but to accept civil society organizations in order to guarantee the continuation of
economic assistance from the West (Kausch, 2012). Another factor that bolstered civil society in
Tunisia was the presence of a large educated middle class, which strengthened labor unions and
created hundreds of new organizations (Adams and Winthrop, 2011). Third, Tunisia’s political
elite supported the consolidation of a strong democratic system, which would eventually lead to
economic development (Kefi, 2015).
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Challenges in Maintaining the Positive Effects of CSOs

Civil society organizations promoted democratic consolidation in Tunisia so effectively
that the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the “Quartet” of Tunisian CSOs, The Tunisian
General Labour Union, The Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts, The
Tunisian Human Rights League, The Tunisian Order of Lawyers, that worked together to make
Tunisia’s peaceful democratic transition possible (The Norwegian Nobel Prize Committee,
2015). Other organizations such as IWatch and Bawsala continue to monitor the work of the
government on daily basis, issuing warnings or statements of condemnation if they see any
deviation from democratic principles and practices. IWatch, an organization that focuses on
fighting corruption and the local representative of Transparency International in Tunisia, filed
several lawsuits against government officials, public institutions, and businessmen. The
organization was responsible for exposing the illegal practices of Nabil Karoui, the president of
the second largest parliamentary block and the second-place candidate in Tunisia’s 2019
presidential elections. IWatch’s work uncovered Karoui’s tax evasion and corruption, leading to
his arrest – and he remained in prison for much of his presidential candidacy (Aliriza, 2017).
Speaking in an interview, the President of IWatch Achref Aouadi stated “right after the
revolution, there was an absence of legitimate institutions, no elected bodies, only few
organizations had the credibility and trust of the people…these organizations vouched for the
transitional process and we managed to get to the electoral law, we managed to get the assembly,
and civil society organizations had a great help.” 2
Although CSOs have had a demonstrably positive effect, new regulations could ensure
that the influence remains positive while eliminating some of the loopholes that allow CSOs to
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Personal interview with Achref Aouadi, president of IWatch Organization, August 2 nd, 2016.
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operate against the best interest of democracy and Tunisian society in general. However,
significant barriers exist that prevent the creation of any new regulatory policy. Some lawmakers
fear that changing Decree Number 88 could negatively impact the democratic process by
harming civil society, and do not want to take that risk for the chance of possible improvement.
Moreover, any change in Decree Number 88 would be seen as limiting the freedoms of these
organizations, which will not only affect the reelection of policymakers, but also the strength of
their political parties. This is because both major parties, and a majority of the minor political
parties, are using loopholes in the CSO law to receive donations in the form of grants, in effect,
allowing money to be funneled through the CSOs to the parties. The parties are also able to use
CSOs to access and receive foreign donations, as well as use charity and religious CSOs to
campaign in certain areas (Kefi, 2015).
After having several consultations with national and international organizations, the 2018
government realized that presenting any amendments to Decree Number 88 would be severely
criticized by the public and resisted by lawmakers. The government of 2018 decided to adopt a
different approach by using the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism report
issued by the intergovernmental Finance Action Task Force (FATF, 2017). In response to this
report, the government adopted a new National Registry Law, Law Number 30 of 2018. The new
legislation was intended only for companies in the private sector, however, policy makers
included civil society and required organizations to adhere to the same requirements as public
and private enterprises (Shahin, 2018). Adding CSOs under the umbrella of this law was
immediately criticized by international organizations, which denounced it as a threat to the
democratic process. These NGOs and other domestic opponents argued that a large number of
organizations lack the capacity to comply with the new requirements, and that the law was
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inappropriate for CSO regulation because it was crafted for application on the private sector. In
an interview with Mouheb Garoui, executive director of IWatch, he stated “authorities cannot
expect from non-profit organizations and lucrative companies to adhere to the same
requirements; based on the new law, the government is expecting CSOs to submit detailed audit
reports, and if they fail, they can get fined and jailed…companies have the resources to hire
professional auditors, organizations do not.”3 Local and international organizations worked
together with a parliamentary bloc that opposed the new law. Acting together as a coalition of
opposition, these stakeholders raised the matter to the Interim Constitutional Court for judicial
review.4 The government immediately issued a statement stating that the law will not have any
negative impact on freedom of associations, and it is only intended to fight terrorism. Despite
these efforts at positive messaging, Freedom House demoted Tunisia from the “Free” Category
to “Partially Free” and cited the crackdown on associations as one of the reasons for its new
classification (Freedom House, 2019).
The Tunisian government is facing a catch-22 when dealing with civil society
organizations. On one hand, international donors such as the European Union require stronger
implementation policies that will help to combat money laundering and terrorism since Tunisia
was designated as “a high-risk country with strategic anti-money laundering and counterterrorist
financing deficiencies” by the European Commission (Ltif, 2020). On the other, any move to
prevent such problems with greater oversight of CSOs is deemed an anti-democratic move to
squash civic engagement.
After complying with the Commission’s requirements and endorsing Law Number 30 of
2018, Tunisia was removed from the EU’s list of “high risk” countries, but the actions that
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Phone interview with Mouheb Garoui, Executive Director of IWTACH, June 20th, 2020.
The 2014 parliament failed to elect a Constitutional Court and many cases are still pending its election.
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accomplished this important change proved to be enough of a deviation from the democratic
process that Tunisia’s democracy reputation suffered a hit as Freedom House moved Tunisia
from the list of “Free” to the list of “Partially Free” countries. The Tunisian government
struggles to find a balance between protecting civil freedoms and imposing regulatory policies,
and this struggle will likely continue unless a consensus that includes CSOs is established.

The Negative Impact of CSOs

Since the Tunisian transitional legislative institution was mainly composed of civil
society components, the focus on establishing a liberal decree regulating civil society
organizations was a priority. Decree Number 88 was quickly drafted policy, created and passed
with a limited consideration of the eventual implementation process. This led to several
complications, some of which created negative effects for the democratic process itself.
Scholars such as Maha Abdelrahman (2004) and Sheri Berman (1997) who take a more
nuanced view of the role of civil society questioned whether there is necessarily positive
relationship between civil society and democracy. Abd Errahman argues that foreign NGOs
support their own self-serving agendas in the countries in which they operate. Abd Errahman
cites examples in which foreign funding paid to Egyptian CSOs influences the long-term
agendas that these organizations support in Egypt (Abdelrahman, 2004). In her work, Berman
argues that the emergence of civil society does not necessarily mean democratization is assured.
She presents the Weimar Republic as a compelling example of a democracy with a deeply rooted
and vibrant civil society that nonetheless fell to fascism (Berman, 2007).
Azmi Beshara, in Civil Society: A Critical Study (2012) argues that civil society
organizations could also have a negative impact on democracies. Studying the example of Libya,
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Beshara shows how CSOs served the negative potential of harming democratic aspirations via 1)
prioritizing and implementing the self-serving agendas of foreign influences, at the expense of
Libya’s own needs, and 2) exploiting tribal divisions to achieve the political gains sought by
these outside groups, which served to exacerbate violence and extremism in Libya. Beshara
explains that even when it seemed promising at first glance, the actual implementation of civil
society failed in many Arab countries because it was imported from foreign countries with
different socio-political dynamics. Beshara states that civil society in the Arab word was mainly
used by dictators to crack down on opposition.
This was true in pre-revolution Tunisia, where Ben Ali controlled thousands of
organizations all over the country that were in charge of monitoring people and reporting to the
local or regional party fields (Hudáková, 2019). Azmi Beshara also states that civil society in the
Arab world pushed many intellectuals away from any form of social activism. Resulting from
this, there was very little opportunity to take part in opposition movements, and most activism in
the Arab world was association with the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist movement which most
secular intellectuals did not identify with, and most declined to support at all. This alienated
many of the educated elite class and precluded them from participating at all in the Islamic
controlled social activism.
Mohammed Salih Ben Isaa (2014), previous Minister of Justice in Tunisia, in a study
conducted in collaboration with Kawakbi Center for Democratic Transitions, discussed the
implications of public financing on the newly established civil society organizations in Tunisia.
Ben Isaa argues that Decree Number 88 was a significant first step that broke away from old
policies and gave CSOs great flexibility. However, he states that the Decree is missing
regulatory policies that can hold organizations accountable in cases where there is misuse of
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public funds. Ben Isaa starts his research by presenting a comparative study of variations in the
legislation endorsed after 2011 and then analyzing the major implications on the increase of
financing to organizations. He finds that the legislation passed in 2011 aimed only to address
Tunisia’s public financing of CSOs and failed to take into consideration the examples of foreign
funding to organizations. As a result, Ben Isaa argues, the institution established to deal with
CSOs lacks the capacity to monitor the large amount of money funneled into Tunisia via CSOs
after the revolution. Ben Isaa ends his study by explaining that the lack of an existing
implementation mechanism is threatening the credibility of all civil society organizations in
Tunisia and underlining the importance of establishing regulatory policies that can hold noncompliant organizations accountable.
The lack of clear regulations that can hold organizations accountable and produce a clear
law enforcement mechanism is becoming a direct threat to civil society organizations as well as
to the democratic process. Anwar Mnasri, a judge with Tunisia’s Administrative Court, argues in
his book titled The Reality of Civil Society in Tunisia (2018) that there are several legislative
gaps in Decree Number 88 that threaten the viability of civil society organizations. First, he
explains that the Decree Number 88 did not mention any operational penalties or legal
repercussions for missing information and/or documents when an organization sends its
application to register. The lack of prescribed penalty places administrative workers who process
applications in dilemma when they accept applications, as many organizations submit paperwork
that is missing required information that is used for tracking CSO activities, sources of funding,
and members. However, all applications were automatically accepted since the Decree did not
state otherwise.
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Second, the decree did not create any formal appeals process for an organization to
initiate in the case that the organization’s application is denied. This gap was intentional, mainly
designed to prioritize the objective of openness and the goal of not rejecting any organization.
However, Mnasri mentioned that in the previous years, many applications were rejected based on
ideological principles, which, ironically, is a move that does contradict the spirit of Decree
Number 88, as well as the ostensible goal of encouraging all legal civil society activity.
Third, Article 4 of Decree Number 88 states that “associations are prohibited from…
adopting in their bylaws, data, programs, or activities any incitement for violence, hatred,
fanaticism or discrimination on religious, racial, or regional grounds.” Although this strong
language in Article 4 is narrow in focus to only prohibit these extremist philosophies and actions,
Mnasri finds that in recent years there are cases in which the General Administration for
Associations and Political Parties required organizations to change their bylaws, even though
they did not violate Article 4.
Throughout his book, Anwar Mnasri explains that the absence of clear regulatory policies
codified in Decree Number 88 is putting civil society organizations at risk. He explains that with
the lack of regulatory policies, many administrative workers are applying old regulations that
present a real threat to the freedom of civic activism. Mnasri ended his book with a number of
recommendations that focus on the importance of addressing the gaps in Decree Number 88 and
passing regulatory policies to tackle this issue, empower the administrative court and give it the
jurisdiction to solve existing issues between the government and civil society organizations, and
evaluate all the existing legislations that address civil society organizations.
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Foreign Finance and Implications for the Democratic Process

In the case of Tunisia, the lack of government supervision over civil society organizations
is causing major problems which are purportedly on the rise in recent years. According to data
issued by the Government’s Center for Information, Training, Study, and Documentation of
Organizations (IFEDA Center) in May 2020, more than 23,000 NGOs operate in Tunisia. A
large number of these organizations carry out religious and preaching activities, and under their
cultural, social, and religious pretexts, many of them have been accused of recruiting Foreign
Tunisian Fighters (FTFs) for ISIS and even facilitating their travel to conflict zones such us
Libya, Iraq, and Syria. The previous Minister for Government Relations with Constitutional
Bodies, Civil Society, and Human Rights, Kamel Jandoubi, indicated in an official statement that
many religious associations have been involved in sending thousands into conflict zones and
have direct relationships with terrorist groups (Nadhif, 2017). A personal interview with Kamel
Jandoubi confirmed that “to an extent, there is a relationship between some organizations and
some extremists or violent circles, we are also monitoring relationships between some
organizations and specific political parties.” 5
With this, millions of dollars in foreign funding is channeled into Tunisia through the
growing network of CSOs, making it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for the government
to monitor these funds. Monitoring and regulation were virtually impossible during the first years
following the revolution. The graph in Figure 2.1 below charts the foreign aid received by the
Tunisian government. A notable observation is that the level of foreign aid has
dramatically increased since the pre-revolution year of 2008, where in that year alone “Tunisia
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Phone interview with Kamel Jandoubi, on November 11, 2016 in Tunis, Tunisia.
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received $314 million in total net official development assistance…[and] by 2012, that figure has
nearly tripled, to $935 million” (Klaas, Dirsus, 2018). Civil society organizations benefited
significantly from this influx of foreign aid, since a large amount of the money was in the forms
of assistance and investment channeled through local and international organizations (Klaas,
Dirsus, 2018).
The numbers in the graph only include the transactions that went through the central bank
and does not cover any financial activity conducted overseas – such as when capacity building
programs were run outside of Tunisian borders or if cash was given to participants to bring with
them to Tunisia.

Figure 2.1: Net Official Development Assistance6 Received Per Capita (current US$)
Source: World Bank (2018)

6

Net official development assistance (ODA) consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of
repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in
countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. (World Bank, 2018)
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Decree Number 88 facilitated the financing of association activities by giving CSOs the
right to receive public aid, donations, grants, bequests, subscriptions from members, and revenue
generated from the association’s properties, activities, and projects (Tunisian Government
Legislation Office, 2011). Decree Number 88 was considered a win for civil liberties in Tunisia.
It is inspired by European legislation, mainly French laws, and was considered the first step to
strengthening the democratic transition. Hundreds of new associations were established based on
this law, and consequently, funds were received from all over the world (Chabkoun, 2015). Ala
Sultani, a government employee in charge of processing CSOs’ applications stated in a personal
interview, “the 2011 committee that created Decree Number 88 was missing an expert in CSO
law . . . [and] the legislation was a mosaic of French, British, and Egyptian laws, without taking
into consideration the Tunisian context.”7
Despite the praise the decree received, it soon became clear that the legislation was
problematic. The Administrative Court soon began receiving cases against several organizations
for money laundering and links to extremist organizations, while the government realized that it
should legislate greater restrictions on the transfer of funds within and to organizations. But the
first interim government lacked sufficient time and bandwidth to respond to these problems
because the focus was on Tunisia’s first democratic elections, which were held only one month
after Decree 88 was passed. Furthermore, the National Constituent Assembly was immediately
tasked with more pressing issues than CSO regulation, such as drafting the new national
constitution and leading the country through the next round of democratic elections (Ben Ltayaf,
2012).

7

Personal Interview with Ala Sultani on August 26, 2016 in Tunis, Tunisia.
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Major political parties such as Nidaa Tounes and Ennahdha Movement are using CSOs to
create a platform through which they can receive foreign funds, as well as maintain activity in
rural areas and run campaigns (Chabkoun, 2015). In 2017, Prime Minister Youssef Chahed
initiated a war against corruption and gave CSOs a period of one month to declare the sources of
their funding as well as the amounts of funding they are receiving. There have been no reported
follow-up actions taken against NGOs since then, although significantly, the Prime Minister’s
political party, Nidaa Tounes, was directly benefiting from the lack of supervision
(Nadhif, 2017). In a personal interview with Dr. Khalil Amiri, the Deputy Minister for Scientific
Research, he stated “civil society organizations are sometimes really political parties in
disguise…I can point to some, in terms of political instrumentalization. I know some civil
society organizations are really crucially associated with political parties or in fact the first stage
of a political party…I know that some associations are aligned with certain and maybe with
foreign ideologies and agendas.”8
Outside of Tunisia, countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar continue using
CSOs to implement specific agendas in Tunisia. The UAE, for example, tacitly demonstrated its
opposition to democratic transitions in the Arab World while spending millions of dollars to stop
Tunisian Islamists from gaining political power (Davidson, 2015). Underlying this phenomenon
is the fact that a proliferation of democracy in the Middle East and North Africa would present a
direct threat to monarchies such as the United Arab Emirates, which generates motivation for all
of the Gulf monarchies to spend money and resources liberally to prevent that from happening.
The UAE’s effort to halt democratic transitions in the Middle East and North Africa has been
successful in Egypt (Quasimi, 2012), but so far, not in Tunisia. Besides the role of civil society
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Phone Interview with Khalil Amiri, Deputy Minister for Scientific Research, on May 23, 2020.
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discussed above, a contributing factor to Tunisia’s success is the fact that the UAE’s major
adversary, Qatar, is spending even more money to promote the democratic process in Tunisia
(Osman, 2016). While Qatar’s financial support is helpful for Tunisian democratic consolidation,
it nonetheless shows that another country is using money, funneled through NGOs, to interfere in
Tunisian politics.
Decree Number 88 was first intended to facilitate the creation of new organizations that
will play a major role in consolidating the democratic process. Several resulting new
organizations provided networks to advocate for the interests of common citizens, connect these
citizens to their governments, and create watchdog groups that can hold the new democratic
government accountable (Sahhin, 2018). The flexibly of this law soon turned many organizations
from protecting citizens’ interest and watching for any deviation in the democratic process to a
sphere where political parties, private interests, and regional players can use their own resources
to influence the decision-making process.
International organizations, human rights and civic activists, and local organizations
consider Decree Number 88 to be a revolutionary law and have been fighting any proposed
changes. Many organizations are using the lack of implementation of the law to serve illegal
purposes, and whether done intentionally or unintentionally, this negatively impacts the
democratic process. Again, this dynamic underpins the European Commission’s decision to
classify Tunisia as a “High Risk” country for money laundering and the financing of terrorist
enterprise, and is a reason why the EU regularly threatens to cut off foreign aid that the
government of Tunisia relies on to support the struggling economy. Without such funding, the
continued democratic consolidation would only become more challenging due to added
economic hardship.
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Conclusions and Recommendations

Tunisia has emerged from the Arab Spring as the only lasting democratic success story in
the wave of revolutions that swept the MENA region. Even with three rounds of free and fair
elections (six elections total for president and parliament), each culminating in a turnover of
power in which incumbents respect the electoral results, Tunisian democratic consolidation
remains a work in progress. The key takeaway for policymakers and Tunisian stakeholders alike
is the paradoxical negative effects of civil society organizations. While civil society
organizations have (and do) play a major role in Tunisia’s continued democratic consolidation, a
fraction of these organizations are working to undermine Tunisia’s nascent democratic
institutions – sometimes knowingly and other times not.
While malpractice is clear in the case of CSOs that intentionally fail to obey regulations
in order to achieve illegal ends, it can be less clear, but perhaps more insidious, when wellintentioned CSOs undermine the democratic institutions which allow them to thrive by failing to
comply with mandatory reporting. Whether the failure is intentional but without illegal intent, or
entirely unintentional, there is a double edge to the role played by civil society organizations in
the Tunisian political environment – what is definitely positive for Tunisian democracy can
easily become an obstacle to the institutions that form a necessary foundation for that democracy
to continue to thrive. Understanding the double-edged nature of CSOs impact in Tunisia is both
critical and timely.
Policymakers missed an opportunity when they failed to converse with representatives of
civil society organizations about changing Decree Number 88, and instead acted unilaterally to
add CSOs as a regulated category under the Law Number 30 of 2018. Additionally, the local and
international communities felt betrayed when this action was taken by Tunisian authorities who
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consider Decree Number 88 as the only protection against a complete government crackdown on
civil activism. Policy makers will continue to struggle in dealing with problems associated with
civil society organizations and the main challenge remains on how to approach this topic.
Toward this end, the Tunisian government should work hand in hand with both local and
international partners to overcome the challenges of consistent and fair regulatory enforcement,
while being careful not to stifle civic engagement, avoiding the potential negative implications
for democratic processes discussed above.
The following recommendations, grouped into five specific categories can assist Tunisian
policy makers to overcome the challenges accompanying civil society organizations:
1)

The governmental institution in charge of creating and monitoring civil society

organizations suffers from lack of personnel, equipment, and adequate training. Without a proper
restructure of this institution, any recommended implementation mechanism will be ineffective.
Therefore, the government should conduct several meetings with representative of national and
international organizations and discuss the restructure of the institution based on their
recommendations. Then, the government should present a well-structured capacity building
program that includes the recommendations presented by CSO representatives, aiming to
digitalize the institution and simplify the communication channels with civil society
organizations. This step should create the infrastructure of a monitoring mechanism that can hold
non-compliant organizations accountable without being blamed for limiting civic liberties.
2)

The current number of registered organizations is 23,363 (IFEDA, 2020). A large

number of these organizations were established before the revolution and many of them are not
currently active. The government should follow up with the General Directorate of Associations
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and Political Parties, created in 2014, and request that all active organizations register with the
directory and clearly explain that the non-compliant ones will be automatically shutdown.
Authorities should make this process both easy and accessible. For instance, registration
could be done online by filling a form in the General Directorate of Associations’ website, in
person by providing the ability for organizations to complete registration in local municipalities,
or by completing a form and sending it to the Directorate by mail.
The government should explain that sole purpose of this activity is to obtain an exact
count of the currently active organizations. This step will ensure that active, legally-operating
CSOs will not be harmed, nor will their activities be curtailed, which should not only ease
worries of legitimate CSOs, but should also be beneficial to them, for if the government has a
clear understanding of the number of active organizations, this could lead to improved
relationships between these CSOs and the government (and potentially better ability to direct
money to the active legitimate organizations).
3)

A coalition of policymakers that does favor changing Decree Number 88 should

recognize that it would be highly unlikely that they would ever gain significant parliamentary
support. With a realistic view of this, they can make the strategically optimal decision that any
proposed legal amendment should only address the regulatory part of the Decree. The
government should build on existing policies such as Articles 3 and 4 of Decree Number 88 and
the Law Number 26 of 2015. Article 4 of Decree 88 presents some restrictions on CSOs, such as
supporting political parties, stating that “associations are prohibited from the following:
Collection of money to support political parties or candidates for national, regional or local
elections” (Decree Number 88, 2011). The Decree fails to mention other illegal activities that
could be conducted by CSOs and a clear punishment process. Law Number 26 of 2015 added
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money laundering and supporting terrorism to complement Article 4 of Decree Number 88 and
created a clear punishment process under the authority of the Judiciary system (Alzubairi, 2019).
Here again, instead of creating scattering policies that could be easily challenged, the
government should engage with civil society organizations to create clear policies that can hold
non-compliant organizations accountable. This should also be accompanied with capacity
building programs to be conducted by local and international organizations designed to
communicate to the CSOs exactly how they can comply with the new regulations.
4)

Currently, the political parties and CSOs that benefit from the lack of government

supervision are the strongest voices advocating against any policy changes; these organizations
are currently dominating the narrative that presents government intervention as a step backwards
in the democratic process. In reality, many of the legitimate organizations would benefit from
being counted, and from the closure of non-legitimate organizations – this is a shared goal that
would also be beneficial to the government and (more abstractly) Tunisia’s continued democratic
consolidation. This is a natural coalition of stakeholders.
Once this coalition of advocates is brought together around the issue, the government
should empower the independent media and bring to their attention the contradictory role of civil
society and the challenges the government facing to establish new regulations. This step will
help bring the issues associated with civil society and its implications to the forefront of the
public’s attention. Such a move will further strengthen the democratic process by bringing
transparency to the decisions, help the public understand the importance of CSO registration, and
these public support initiatives will have the ancillary effect of giving legislators in parliament
the cover they need to support the policy changes without fear of public retribution (in the form
of losing their seats in the next elections).
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Making this media outreach easier, there are several TV programs that will gladly adopt
such investigation and invite government officials and representatives of civil society
organizations to discuss the issue. Once the contradictory roles of civil society organizations
become a public opinion issue, policy makers will compete to advocate for new regulations.
5)

The Ministry of Finance has maintained absolute control regarding the monitoring

of money laundering and countering terrorism. This power has had repercussions for several
organizations as many of the Ministry’s administrative workers have issued decisions that
contradict current legislation, yet the Ministry’s decisions have stood. This type of contradictory
exercise of government power only serves to solidify the perception that the government is unfair
and corrupt, both notions that have been harmfully intransigent in Tunisia’s developing
democratic consolidation. The Prime Ministry can combat this problem by limiting the
jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry and coordinating between different government institutions
regarding regulating the activities of civil society organizations. If done effectively, this action
would solve the problem of the Finance Ministry’s overreach, while also strengthening public
support for reform to Decree Number 88, and ultimately, help accomplish the goal of bringing
the advocacy coalition to the metaphorical “open window” for change.
These actions would also be helped by the establishment of a national database (as
recommended above) that includes all available information regarding active organizations and
establishing a coordination mechanism between governmental institutions that are tracking the
work of CSOs. This step will enable establishing a more transparent process based on the
expertise of each institutions and avoid the existing conflict. In short, not only are the five steps
presented here independently helpful, but taken in concert, they would build on one another,
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providing a mutually supportive foundation for bringing together a coalition of actors
empowered by public support to bring change to the CSO oversight system.
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CHAPTER 3: The Impact of Civil Society Organizations on the Tunisian Democratic
Transition: A Qualitative Study
Introduction
Since the 2011 uprising, Tunisian society witnessed a major transformation: political and
social activism became common practice, and the average citizen began engaging in the ongoing
democratic consolidation (Mansouri, 2020). During this last decade, Tunisia’s political scene
became very dynamic, which is to say that many new political parties appeared, while other
standard bearers ceased to exist. Tunisia now has 226 registered political parties, but of these,
very few are original major parties that existed prior to 2011 (Yerkes, 2019). For instance,
Ennahdha Movement, being one of the few parties to preserve its existence over the first decade
of Tunisia’s nascent democracy, is now a diminished presence in comparison to its original
showing in electoral politics (Ben Yahmed and Yerkes, 2019).
Several political parties and social movements – among them the People’s Petition for
Freedom []العريضة الشعبية, which won the third largest block in the 2011 elections, and the
Congress for the Republic []المؤتمر من اجل الجمهورية, which won the second largest block in the
2011 elections – have disappeared from the political scene altogether (Abouaoun, 2019). In
another example, the party Call for Tunisia []نداء تونس, which won the largest parliamentary block
in the 2014 elections, lost most of its membership and many of its parliamentary seats in the
2019 election to some of the newly established political parties such as Long Live Tunisia [ تحيا
 ]تونسand Heart of Tunisia [( ]قلب تونسReuters, 2020). This fast-changing political dynamic and
the desire to take part in consolidating the democratic process pushed the average citizen away
from politics and toward other forms of civic activism; by early 2020, the number of
organizations had increased from 9000 to 25000 (IFEDA, 2020).
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Tunisia has a long-established history of civic activism that predates the Arab Spring.
Starting with the dictatorship of Habib Bourgiba, and under the subsequent authoritarian tenure
of Ben Ali, civil society organizations flourished. During the post-colonial/pre-revolutionary era,
civil society was mainly centered around charitable, educational, sport, and development
endeavors (Deane, 2013). Although these first-generation CSOs were largely apolitical, the
structure that they provided not only facilitated an organized path to democratic transition, but
they also undergirded the newly minted social order of political transparency that proved
invaluable for Tunisia’s successful democratic consolidation (Martin, 2015). In the postdemocratization era, Tunisia’s civil society organizations began to enter novel categories such as
fighting corruption, monitoring the work of the government, and advocating for personal and
minority freedoms (Foundation for the Future, 2016).
With the introduction of Decree Number 88, this new category of politically engaged
civil society activity was protected for the first time, providing opportunities for Tunisian
citizens to found new organizations that take an activist approach to politics or engage in other
“government watchdog” functions, all activities which were banned by Ben Ali because of the
threat that they posed to the regime (Fortier, 2019). With one important step to making this
possible, Decree Number 88 switched the regulatory jurisdiction over CSOs from the Ministry of
Interior to the office of the Prime Minister. Much more than a symbolic gesture, this action
embedded in Decree Number 88 constitutes a substantive policy change because it enables direct
executive engagement in the regulation and enforcement of CSOs (Belin, 2013).
From a policy analysis perspective, it is critical not to underestimate the importance of
this element of Decree Number 88. In the post-Arab Spring era civil society, Decree Number 88
is considered sacrosanct by Tunisian lawmakers and citizens alike. As such, the move to
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empower the prime minister with authority over CSOs is both a popular policy outcome and an
indication of current national sentiment. In other words, this case illustrates policy as
representing societal values and societal values as being shaped by policy. The tangible outcome
of this system is that ordinary Tunisians are now empowered with the opportunity of starting a
new generation of organizations – politicized ones that even critique the government – which
used to be prohibited before the revolution (Mnasri, 2018).
Since democratization, Tunisian civil society has played a major role in consolidating the
ongoing democratic process. In 2011, several organizations participated in the transitional body
and guided the country toward the election of the National Constituent Assembly (Msaddak,
2016). Once the Assembly was elected, CSOs also played an important role in drafting the
constitution by 1) monitoring the work of an Islamist majority Assembly and assuring the
continuation of the existing freedoms, 2) pressuring the assembly to endorse a semi-presidential
system that does not give the president absolute power, 3) mitigating the conflict between the
Islamist led government and the opposition, after the assassination of two opposition leaders, and
4) negotiating the transition to a technocratic government (Jemail, 2015).
Following the endorsement of the new constitution, the country moved to elect its first
parliament and appoint a government based on the winning parties. The election resulted in a
fragmented parliament and the appointment of a national unity government that included several
political parties (Avery, 2015). Even though picking a national unity government was praised as
great decision for Tunisia’s novice democracy, precisely because the coalition led to governance
by consensus (Feuer, 2016), it resulted in the absence of any real opposition that would
effectively monitor the work of the government. The role of opposition systematically landed on
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prominent unions such as UGTT and post-revolution organizations such as Bawsala and IWacth,
a role that these civil society actors embraced (Ben Hassine, 2018).
When guiding the process of democratic transition, Tunisian policymakers took into
consideration the important role civil society organizations are playing, leveraging CSOs’ work
to strengthen the ongoing transition. One of the initial transitional decrees, passed in 2011, aimed
to support the right to free association. The new legislation, Decree Number 88, provided
activists with the freedom of establishing organizations and removed the major restrictions
imposed by the previous regime (Yerkes, 2018). As Figure 3.1 shows, the number of
organizations increased from 9969 in 2010 to 14,966 in 2012 (IFEDA data base).

Figure 3.1: Evolution of the Number of CSOs in Tunisia (1980-2012)
Source: Foundation for the Future, (2013, p7).

The Tunisian government was not prepared for this massive surge in the number of CSOs
and did not have the infrastructure to monitor this large number of organizations (Jandoubi,
2015). Many CSOs used the lack of government supervision to conduct unlawful activities; this
resulted in a government crackdown by dissolving 198 organizations and issuing 947 warning to
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others, which many considered illegal and challenged the government decision in court (Yassine,
2018).
Aim of this Study
The aim of this study is to analyze the role civil organizations are currently playing on the
Tunisian democratic process and establish patterns that helped generating the main hypotheses.
The initial data analysis recognized the contradictory impact of CSOs, in which CSO activity
actually undermines the beneficial effects of civil society, creating a disruptive influence on the
Tunisian democratic process. After further analysis, the common denominator that emerged
among the positive and negative aspects of CSOs appear to be Decree Number 88. Based on this
discovery, I introduce two hypotheses:
H1) Civil society organizations are playing a contradictory role in Tunisian politics,
leading to both positive and negative results for democratic consolidation.
H2) Decree Number 88 is considered the shield protecting civil society organizations and
any proposed changes should only tackle the regulatory level.
Data, Methods, and Findings

Qualitative data for this dissertation consists of observations, in-depth interviews, and
public statements made by policymakers and politicians over a period of nine years. To analyze
the collected data, I use grounded analysis; this methodology is a fruitful way to handle the
multiple sources of qualitative data, as it allows following the common themes emerging from
this mixed body of data, but with a systematic approach that will yield reproducible results
(Corbin and Strauss, 2015).
The analytic process begins with data collection and continues with the initial stage of
coding. The coding methodology employed here consists of indexing themes from the transcripts
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to enable the identification and analysis of all possible topics that could prove essential to the
main subject (Taber, 2016). To organize this process and ensure replicability, NVivo software
for qualitative data analysis was used to analyze themes emerging from the collected data and
then to link these themes to the central research questions introduced in the previous chapters.
During a three-stage coding process, I first use “Open Coding” which involves carefully
sorting through the collected data looking for similar themes, categories, and ideas. The next step
consists of giving each theme a “Code Label” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Once all data have
been categorized, I initiate inquiries, make comparisons, and analyze common themes among the
comments. Then I use “Axial Coding” to make connections among the categories and
subcategories previously established and focus on the variables that influenced the contradictory
role of CSOs on the Tunisian Democratic Process. Finally, I employ “Selective Coding” to
identify the core category on which I am basing my research (Vollstedt and Rezat, 2019). I aim
to validate its relationship to other classifications and focus on the categories that require more
development.
Once all three stages of coding are complete, I apply the “Constant Comparative Method”
to compare recently collected data with what I collected previously, assess extant theories, and
confirm, enhance, or even discount them (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). This method in which the
researcher is compelled to “circle back” to compare results across time is necessary when the
subject matter is dynamic, always subject to a subtly shifting political landscape. Rooting out the
consistencies submerged within the dynamic sea of the political system is the methodological
aim of this research project; doing so will lead to deep understanding of the real impact of CSOs
and underpins the methodological logic of this mixed-methods research.
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Qualitative Data Analysis
During the data collection phase, I compile two categories of data: A) personal interviews
with policy makers and administrative workers, members of compliant civil society
organizations, members of non-compliant civil society organizations, and public figures aware of
the contradictory role of civil society organizations; B) statements made by public officials
regarding policies regulating CSOs. I also collected a list of official documents such as: Decree
Number 88, court rulings with/against civil society organizations, draft laws issued by
government institutions regarding CSOs, official laws issued by government institutions
regarding CSOs. Figure 3.2 presents the number of conducted personal interviews. Figure 3.3
presents the chronology of public statements by the ministers. Figure 3.4 presents the interview
characteristics.
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Figure 3.2: Personal Interviews
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Public Official

Names

Dates

Source

Minister of Relations of

Kamel Jandoubi

September 2015

Al-Sabah

Constitutional Bodies, Civil

Newspaper

Society, and Human Rights
Minister of Relations of

Kamel Jandoubi

October 2015

Chames FM

Youssef Chahed

September 2016

Al- Sabah

Constitutional Bodies, Civil
Society, and Human Rights
Prime minister

Newspaper
Minister of Relations of

Mehdi Ben Gharbia

November 2016

Constitutional Bodies, Civil

Al-Arab
Newspaper

Society, and Human Rights
Minister of Relations of

Mehdi Ben Gharbia

February 2017

Constitutional Bodies, Civil

Al-Sabah
Newspaper

Society, and Human Rights
Minister of Relations of

Mehdi Ben Gharbia

June 2017

Constitutional Bodies, Civil

Al-Sabah
Newspaper

Society, and Human Rights
Minister of Relations of

Mehdi Ben Gharbia

October 2017

Constitutional Bodies, Civil

Al-Sabah
Newspaper

Society, and Human Rights
Minister of Relations of

Mehdi Ben Gharbia

November 2017

Constitutional Bodies, Civil

Al-Sabah
Newspaper

Society, and Human Rights
Chief of Staff of the Minister of

Mondher Bousnina

December 2017

Relations of Constitutional Bodies,

Al-Arab
Newspaper

Civil Society, and Human Rights
Prime Minister

Youssef Chahed

November 2018

Al-Sabah
Newspaper

Figure 3.3: Public official statements
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1
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Figure 3.4: Interview characteristics

The goal of collecting this data is to gain a clear understanding of the role of civil society
organizations in Tunisia, examine interviewees opinion about Decree Number 88, discuss the
challenges facing CSOs, understand the importance of Decree Number 88 in protecting civic
freedoms, and generate and test the dissertation hypotheses.
Procedures and Data Collection

The interview protocol was approved by the University of Arkansas Institutional Review
Board. An introductory email was sent to the interviewees explaining the purpose of the
research, followed by a phone call to confirm their participation. The informed consent form was
explained to participants initially, and then the complete version was read to participants over the
phone. For in-person interviews, the same consent document was provided to study participants
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when initiating the in-person meeting, for the participants to read and sign on the day of the
interview, prior to commencing. Regarding interviews conducted over the phone, the consent
form was shared via email. Participant’s right to decline to answer specific questions, withdraw
from the interview, or refuse to be identified by their real names was also explained. It was
emphasized that the recording will be erased after finishing transcribing the interviews.
Data were collected through a rigorous set of structured interviews. 13 out of 15
interviews were recorded and the remaining two participants granted me permission to take
notes. I personally conducted all interviews, transcribed them, and translated the ones conducted
in the Tunisian dialect of Arabic or French into English. I designed the first round of interviews
to provide a clear understanding and background knowledge of civil servants’ perceptions of
CSOs in Tunisia, Decree Number 88, the challenges facing public officials introducing new
changes, and the impact of civil society organizations on the Tunisian democratic process. The
second round of interviews was designed to reveal any changes that may have occurred and to
ensure comparability across the sample.
A second category of collected data was comprised of ten public statements made by
government officials that allude to the contradictory role of civil society in general and/or
explicitly discuss Decree Number 88. All statements were published in local newspapers in
Arabic. My purpose for collecting these public statements was to enable to the systematically
tracking of public officials’ opinions regarding CSOs and to monitor any changes in their
statements over time.
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Interviews
Within the course of my research, I conducted 15 interviews. 11 interviews were
conducted in 2016 and four in 2020. Four of these interviews were conducted in English and 11
were conducted in the Tunisian Dialect.
The first round of interviews conducted in 2016 provide a clear understanding of civil
society organizations in Tunisia, Decree Number 88, the challenges facing public officials in
introducing new changes, and the impact of civil society organizations on the Tunisian
democratic process. The first interview was conducted with Kamel Jandoubi, Minister of
Relations of Constitutional Bodies, Civil Society, and Human Rights. I picked Mr. Kamel
Jandoubi because he was a member of Human Rights organizations before the revolution, was
elected as the president of the Higher Authority of Realization of Objectives of the Revolution,
Political Reform, and Democratic Transition, took part of drafting transitional Decrees such as
Decree Number 88, and was appointed as the Minister of Relations of Constitutional Bodies,
Civil Society, and Human Rights.
The purpose of this interview was to establish a baseline of common themes for the
research project. The common themes that emerged from my interview with minister Jandoubi
are:
1) Decree Number 88 represents a psychological, political, and administrative shift in
Tunisia.
2) Decree 88 moved from a system of authorization to a system of declaration;
3) There is a lack of implementation of the decree.
4) There is a lack of transparency from the CSO side regarding finances;
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5) Administration representatives are having difficulties adopting to the new
regulations;
6) There is a link between some violent extremist circles and some organizations;
7) There is a link between several political parties and some organizations;
8) Decree Number 88 was endorsed in special circumstances and needs to be changed to
remedy the transparency and supervision problems;
9) Newly established organizations are suffering from problems of sustainability; and
10) CSOs are playing an important role in consolidating the ongoing democratic
process.
After establishing the research baseline, I conducted 10 interviews with public officials,
representatives of compliant organizations, and representatives of non-compliant organizations.
After each interview, I analyzed the main topics and link these to the themes established with the
initial baseline interview.
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Figure 3.5: Steps of Content Analysis Process

Open Coding

Open coding is considered one of the main methods used in analyzing interview contents;
it consists of searching the data for clues to recurring themes, which we identify as codes, to
enable further analysis. The recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim and subsequently
analyzed in multiple stages to identify common themes. The goal of the first stage of this open
coding method is to generate a large number of codes that will help interpret the existing data
and generate new themes (Strauss and Corbin 1990). The first stage included transcribing the
interviews and highlighting the main topics revealed during the discussion. Figure 3.6 presents
the main codes that emerged from the initial coding process.
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Figure 3.6: Open Codes
The second stage included using NVivo software to enter the initial code set, then run an
analysis on each code in this set to detect the most frequent words and distinguish the common
themes that emerge from the interviews. NVivo analysis determined the codes “important to
democracy,” “implementation problems,” and “financial” as the most repeated word phrases in
the interviews. Other codes such as “institutional shift,” “large number of organizations,” “after
the revolution,” “important to democracy,” “Decree Number 88,” “progressive policy,”
“watchdog,” “financial disclosure,” “political corruption,” and “funding problems” were
repeated in most of the interviews; NVivo software provided a replicable analytic tool to spot
these phrases and interchangeable variations with accuracy.
The third stage consisted of grouping the coded data under broader categories and
comparing these results back to the initial transcripts for consistency and contextual verification
(Mey and Mruck, 2011). This step is a critical check on the coding process, providing
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redundancy to ensure that the results are logical and analytic output is based on valid input. This
step enabled me to summarize the main codes that emerged from the interviews and divide them
into three categories:
1) CSOs are playing a positive role on the Tunisian democratic process;
2) There are many/significant negative factors associated with CSOs; and
3) Decree Number 88 is the common denominator that facilitates both the positive and
the negative impacts of CSOs on the Tunisian Democratic process.

Category 1

Category 2

Category 3

Institutional Shift

Associated with Parties

Progressive Policy

Large Number of organizations

Funding problems

Declaration

Watchdog

Institutional conflict

Authorization

Important to democracy

Political corruption

Lack of implementation

Civic Engagement

Links to extremism

Shield Protecting CSOs

Opposition

Transparency

Challenges facing CSOs

Figure 3.7: Code Groupings

Axial Coding: The Main Topics and Themes
Axial coding is one of the essential steps that contributes to developing the research
theory. It establishes the correlation between the open codes and categorizes them in specific
themes. The process of Axial Coding focuses first on examining the data and providing a clear
understanding to the link between concepts and categories (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Second, it
contributes to developing a precise research theory and examining the interactions among major
themes. Third, it takes into consideration the general conditions such as political situation,

60

economic status, history, and individual background before next associating the conditions with
the most relevant of existing theories. Finally, it examines the preliminary data and narrows the
coding paradigm to specific categories (Strauss, and Corbin, 2015).
The first question in each of the interviews was: “Many scholars consider civil society as
necessary for development of the democratic process. Do you think civil society in Tunisia is
playing this role?” All participants agreed that CSOs in Tunisia are playing a major role in
strengthening the democratic process and many of them stated that post-revolution CSOs operate
with a flexibility that did not exist before. For example, the president of
organization and the Deputy Minister of Scientific Research responded:
Civil society vouched for the whole democratic process in Tunisia. Right after the
revolution, we had a crisis of legitimacy: no one was legitimate, no elected
bodies. When Beji Kaid Essebsi was selected, he empowered a couple of
organizations, like Riadh Ben Ashour’s institutions. Thanks to certain groups of
activists and civil society organizations, we managed to get the electoral laws, we
managed to elect an assembly. 9
Free dynamic and vibrant civil society is very important for a democracy,
especially for a young democracy where basically you do not have all the
democratic institutions in place to play the role of a working democratic system.
At the end of the day, the main goal of democracy is, as one of the founding
fathers called it, government from the people for the people by the people. 10

Even though most responses stated that CSOs are very important to democracy, followup questions usually revealed that these positive sentiments toward CSOs (which are at the
conscious forefront of people’s experiences) were always accompanied with negative
commentary that reveals underlying problems associated with CSOs.
On participant stated that “Civil society played a very important political role and civil
society played a crucial role in building the Tunisian constitution of 2014… Unfortunately, there

9

Personal Interview with Achref Aouadi, president of IWatch Organization, August 2 nd, 2016
Skype Interview with Khalil Amiri, Deputy Minister for Scientific Research on May 23, 2020

10
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is some civil society actors who were biased, or they were driven by ideological factors.”11
Another participant reflected a similar sentiment, saying “Absolutely, CSOs are the key part of
democratic process, however, we cannot also ignore the fact that many organizations are not
following the law and actually threatening the existing fragile democracy.”12
My analyses show that this pattern of negative aspects of CSO activity was not random,
evidenced by the fact that this critique showed up in a majority of the interviews. Ninety percent
of participants who agreed that CSOs are playing a positive impact on the Tunisian democratic
process followed with mention of the negative impacts of CSOs. The same pattern showed up
also in the statements issued by public officials.
The 2015 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded, in unconventional fashion to Tunisian civil
society, as represented by the Tunisian Dialogue Quartet. This was interpreted by many as a
great tribute to the positive impact the many organizations played. Despite this honor, a large
number of interviewees’ and public officials’ statements described myriad problems associated
with CSOs and encouraged further work in order to improve the efficacy of CSOs. This
perspective emerged from the two initial categories of Axial Coding.

11
12

Phone Interview with Mouheb Garoui, executive director of IWatch Organization, July 20 th, 2020
Personal Interview with Hatem Boulabyar, Ennahdha Movement, August 3rd, 2016.
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Figure 3.8: Category 1, The Positive Impact of Civil Society Organizations on the Tunisian
Democratic Process

This part of the research includes going through the collected data and analyzing the
common themes emerging from each question. The purpose of this step is to break down the data
and look for patterns in the initial stage of analysis. In most answers, there was a consensus
about the beneficial role civil society organizations play in consolidating the democratic process.
Nearly all (98%) of the answers involved phrases such as “important to democracy” and
“necessary for democracy”.
Several participants went into more details and specified how CSOs are contributing to
democracy using terminologies such as: “watchdog,” “Post-revolution transition body,”
“Monitoring elections,” “mediation role,” “Nobel Prize of Peace,” “Decree Number 88,” and
“Progressive policies.” This initial analysis provided a common theme within the answers, which
helped generate the first category: Civil Society Organizations have a positive impact on the
Tunisian democratic process.
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Figure 3.9: Category 2, Negative Impact of Civil Society Organizations on the Tunisian
Democratic Process
Even though the initial screening of interviews produced codes such as: “progressive
policies,” “important to democracy,” “increase in CSOs’ numbers,” and “watchdog,” there was
also a common theme which appeared within these coded categories of answers. Every positive
description given to a CSO was later followed by a negative one (or several negative ones) such
as: “financial disclosure,” “political corruption,” “funding problems,” and “institutional
conflict.” This tendency repeatedly appeared throughout the interviews, as each positive
description given to CSOs was followed by at least one negative assessment, which provided a
new theme and generated a second category: Civil Society Organizations have a negative impact
on the Tunisian democratic process.
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Figure 3.10: Category 3, Decree Number 88 and the role its playing in Tunisian Democracy

The third main category that emerged from extensive data analysis was Decree Number
88 itself. Interviewees agreed on that fact that the Decree is a revolutionary piece of legislation,
which changed civic activism in Tunisia. However, as mentioned in the previous section, Decree
88 emerged as the common denominator between the positive and the negative impact of CSOs
on the Tunisian Democratic Process. When asked specifically about Decree Number 88,
interviewees mainly focused on the changes the legislation brought and codes such as
“institutional shift,” “institutional conflict,” “progressive legislation,” and “shield protecting
CSOs” emerged. With the initial screening, codes regarding Decree 88 were conflicting; most
participants agree that Decree Number 88 is the main piece of policy legislation protecting civic
activism in Tunisia, however, several participants also stated that there are many problems
associated with the policy as it stands. Along these lines, respondents stated:
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•

“Decree 88 has all the key elements of freeing civil society from the control of
government.”13

•

“Decree 88 is revolutionary, it enabled the freedom of creation of civil society
and civil society, you know, prior to the Tunisian revolution you cannot form an
association without having an authorization, so we went from the regime or the
system of authorization to the system of declaration.”14

•

“Decree Number 88 was a revolutionary law for civil society, there was a lot of
pressure, censorship, oppression on civil society. After the revolution, one of the
things that people wanted to see is a decree law that would limit the interference
of the ministry of interior on civil society, and also gives more room for civil
society to perform and act, so I would say that the decree law is trying to promote
freedoms more than anything else, and that contribute somehow to the creation of
a new generation of civil society.”15

Even though most interviewees believe that Decree Number 88 is a revolutionary policy
because it freed civil society from the previous regimes’ restrictions, many of them referenced
the decree when discussing the problems associated with civil society in Tunisia. When
conversing about Decree Number 88, we can sort participants into three categories: 1) those
familiar with Decree Number 88 and the legislation associated with it; 2) those who are
somewhat familiar with Decree Number 88 and with the legislation associated with it; and 3)
those who are not familiar with Decree Number 88. As shown in Figure 3.11 below, mainly noncompliant organizations are not familiar with Decree Number 88.

13

Skype Interview with Khalil Amiri, Deputy Minister for Scientific Research on May 23, 2020.
Phone Interview with Mouheb Garoui, executive director of I Watch Organization, July 20, 2020.
15
Personal Interview with Achref Aouadi, president of I Watch Organization, August 2, 2016.
14
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When asked about how Decree Number 88 is negatively impacting civil society, the more
familiar with the Decree participants were, the more precise the answer was. The Minister of
Civil Society as an example, explained that the problem is not actually with the Decree itself, it
is with the administrative workers implementing it. Stating that “the previous system was based
on a prior authorization system, which we got rid of, and we established a simple declaration
system, which represent a paradigmatic shift . . . This shift represents a legal, political,
psychological, and administrative shift, which allowed a proportional work, if we can use that
term, between the law and the goals of the law,”16 Jandoubi emphasizes that there is a gap
between the law and the implementation of the law.
In the second quote, Mouheb Garoui, the executive director of IWatch Organization, also
points to a gap. Garoui stated “Decree 88 it is not probably sufficiently developed in majors of
oversighted control... The only gap I see with Decree 88 is not with the Decree itself, maybe
some references to allow the state to build certain capacities of control and oversight exposed
that actually ensure certain risky aspects of the work of civil societies.”17 Specifically, he
contends that there is a discrepancy between the requirements of the existing law and the
capacity of the institutions in charge of implementing the law.
Also building on this point, Achref Aouadi, the president of IWatch organization, states
that certain aspects of the existing legislation should be altered or changed to reflect the reality of
the institutions in charge of implementation: “After a couple of years, I am seeing all the
problems that the decree law created or the lack of implementation of the decree law, you can tell
that there are things that we can keep and should keep, and there are things that we need to get

16

Phone Interview with Kamel Jandoubi, Minister of Relations of Constitutional Bodies, Civil Society, and Human
Rights, on November 11, 2016 in Tunis, Tunisia.
17
Phone Interview with Mouheb Garoui, executive director of IWatch Organization, July 20th, 2020.
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rid of, so I would say, it should not be the final version of a law, there is so many rooms for
improvement.”18
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Figure 3.11: Participants’ Familiarity with Decree Number 88

Selective Coding
Selective coding is the final step of the coding process. This coding stage focuses on
integrating the categories developed in axial coding into a consistent concept (Teppo, 2015). The
process includes going through the categories developed at the axial level, reviewing the

18

Personal Interview with Achref Aouadi, president of IWatch Organization, August 2 nd, 2016.
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transcripts and the code structure, identifying the main connections with the data, and picking the
core categories that will form the research questions (Vollstedt and Rezat, 2019).
The axial coding provided three main categories: 1) CSOs are playing a positive role on
the Tunisian democratic process; 2) There are many negative factors associated with CSOs; 3)
Decree Number 88 is the common denominator between the positive and negative impact of
CSOs on the Tunisian Democratic process. Based on this process, a second review to the existing
data was conducted to convert the categories developed during the axial coding into one cohesive
theory.
A core category is described as “the central phenomenon around which all the other
categories are integrated” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 116). Following this definition, the core
category of my data is the contradictory impact that civil society organizations have on the
Tunisian democratic process. Once the core category is established, the rest of the research came
together. By identifying that Civil Society Organizations are playing a contradictory role on the
Tunisian democratic process, I had a clear map of my research.
Conclusion
Since the 2011 uprising, civil society organizations have played a major role in Tunisia’s
political trajectory, and specifically, civil society activity has made a substantial impact on the
Tunisian democratic process. This research started in 2016 with a broad question that focuses on
investigating the impact of CSOs on the Tunisian democratic process. The interviews aim to
clarify specific issues and challenges associated with CSOs in Tunisia, examine the impact of
transitional decree laws on civic liberty, and understand the drivers of the challenges associated
with CSOs. After conducting and transcribing the interviews, I used grounded theory methods to
analyze the content. The initial coding process provided three main themes: the positive impact
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of CSOs on the Tunisian Democratic process, the negative impact of CSOs on the Tunisian
democratic process, and Decree Number 88 and its impact on the Tunisian democracy. The final
coding process narrowed down the main themes to a core research category, Tunisian civil
society organizations are playing on contradictory role on the ongoing democratic process.
Based on the core theory, I first conduct an extensive analysis of the reasons behind this
contradictory impact and examine the relationship between CSOs and democratization from a
theoretical perspective; I present the literature that deals with the positive impact CSOs played in
consolidating the Tunisian democratic process, I also present the extant literature that deals with
the negative implications of civil society organizations and apply these findings to the Tunisian
case. In the next chapter, I explain Decree Number 88 from an Advocacy Coalition Framework
perspective. I present the transitional legislation as a Deep Core Belief and conclude that
transitional Decrees, especially Decree Number 88 is the shield protecting CSOs and social
activists from government crackdown. Finally, I provide a list of policy recommendations that
will assist the Tunisian government in reforming the civil society organizations sector without
having any negative impact on existing freedom.

70

References
Abouaoun, Elie. 2019. “Tunisia Timeline: Since the Jasmine Revolution.” United States Institute
of Peace. https://www.usip.org/tunisia-timeline-jasmine-revolution (July 12, 2019).
Atawi, Yassine.2018. “[]تورط أعضاء ومشرفين ببعض الجمعيات في شبهات ارهابية. Some Members of
CSOs are Implicated in Terrorism.” Tunis Numérique, January 2018,
https://ar.tunisienumerique.com/?p=1341650 (September 15, 2020).
Aswad, Habibi. 2017. “Different position in Tunisia regarding amending the Association Law”
[] مواقف متباينة في تونس بشأن تعديل قانون الجمعيات. Al- Arab. https://alarab.co.uk/-تونس-في-متباينة-مواقف
الجمعيات-قانون-تعديل-( بشأنJuly 8, 2020).
Avery, Davis-Robert. 2018. Legislative and Presidential Elections in Tunisia. Election Standards
at the Carter Center. December 28, 2015.
https://electionstandards.cartercenter.org/2015/12/28/tunisia-election-observation-mission-report/
Jemail,Donia. 2015.
Ben Hassine, Wafa. 2018. “Tunisian Civil Society ‘s Unmistakable Role in Keeping the
Peace.” Atlantic Council. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/tunisian-civilsociety-s-unmistakable-role-in-keeping-the-peace (January 19, 2018).
Bellin, Eva. 2013. “Drivers of Democracy: Lessons from Tunisia.” Middle East Brief, 75, 1-8.
Deane, Shelley. 2013. “Transforming Tunisia: The Role of Civil Society in Tunisia’s
Transition.” International Alert, (February, 2013),
https://www.internationalalert.org/sites/default/files/publications/Tunisia2013EN.pdf (October
29, 2019).
Fortier, Edwige. 2019. Contested Politics in Tunisia: Civil Society in a Post-Authoritarian State.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Glaser, Barney G., and Anselm L. Strauss. 2017. Discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for
qualitative research. Chicago: Routledge.
Imen, Abd Ellatif, “[ تغيير مرسوم الجمعيات ضروري ولن يمس من منسوب الحريات:[ مهدي بن غربية. Ben
Gharbia: Changing the Associations Decree is a Must and Won’t Affect Existing Freedoms”,
Assabah News, November 27, 2018. http://www.assabahnews.tn/article/166618/-غربية-بن-مهدي
الحريات-منسوب-من-يمس-ولن-ضروري-الجمعيات-مرسوم-تغيير-»األسبوعي-( لـ«الصباحAccessed June 2nd,
2020).
“Kamel Jandoubi: 157 Organizations are Accused of Supporting Terrorism.” 2015. Radio
Tunisienne. July 28, 2015. http://www.radiotunisienne.tn/2015/07/28/-تحوم-جمعية-157-الجندوبي-كمال
ا-شبهة-حولها/ (July 10, 2019).

71

“Kamel Jandoubi: We are Committed to the Principles of Freedom in the Field of Association.”
Assabah News http://www.assabahnews.tn/article/110432/-في-الحرية-بمكسب-متمسكون-الجندوبي-كمال
الجمعياتي-( المجالAccessed June 3rd, 2020).
Kasmi, Jamii. 2016. “Controversy Over Suspicious Charities in Tunisia” [ جدل ملف الجمعيات الخيرية
]المشبوهة يطفو عال السطح في تونس. Al-Arab. https://alarab.co.uk/-يطفو-المشبوهة-الخيرية-الجمعيات-ملف-جدل
تونس-في-السطح-على
Mansouri, Fethi. 2020. Youth and Political Engagement in Post-Revolution Tunisia” British
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2020.1765142
Middle East Monitor. 2018.
Martin, Alexander. 2015. “Agents of change: Civil Society in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia.”
German Near and Middle East Association Deutsches Orient-Institute / German Orient-Institute
Kronenstrasse 1, 10117 Berlin.
Mey, Günter., and Katja Mruck. 2011. "Grounded-Theory-Methodologie: Entwicklung, Stand,
Perspektiven." Grounded Theory Reader. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. 1148.
Mnasri, Anwar. 2018. The Reality of Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia [ واقع المجتمع المدني في
]تونس. Tunisia: Kawakibi Center for Democratic Transitions.
Rabaoui, Mohammed Salih. 2016. “Youssef Chahed: The Government is Working on New AntiCorruption Laws” [  جديدة قوانين مشاريع على تعمل الحكومة الشاهد يوسف-]الفساد لمكافحة. Assabah News.
http://www.assabahnews.tn/article/131109/-لمكافحة-جديدة-قوانين-مشاريع-على-تعمل-الحكومة-الشاهد-يوسف
الفساد
Rabaoui, Mohammed Salih. 2018. “Youssef Chahed: 11 New Measures to Combat Corrption.”
[ اجراء جديد لمحاربة الفساد11 :]يوسف الشاهد. Assabah News.
http://www.assabahnews.tn/article/198993/ الفساد-لمحاربة-جديد-اجراء-11-الشاهد-يوسف
Rabaoui, Mohammed Salih. 2016. “Mehdi Ben Gharbia: The Government is unable to monitor
more than 19.000 associations, and the decree regulating associations must be reviewed” [ الدولة
 ألف جمعية وال بد من مراجعة قانون الجمعيات19 ]غير قادرة على مراقبة أكثر من. Assabah News.
http://www.assabahnews.tn/article/134543/-ألف-19-من-أكثر-مراقبة-على-قادرة-غير-الدولة-غربية-بن-مهدي
مراجعة-من-بد-وال-جمعية
Rabaoui, Mohammed Salih. 2017. “Mehdi Ben Gharbia: We need to institutionalize the
Relationship with Civil Society and motivate it to Contribute to Development and Employment”
[ نحتاج إلى مأسسة العالقة بالمجتمع المدني وحفزه على المساهمة في التنمية:مهدي بن غربية
]و التشغيل. Assabah News. http://www.assabahnews.tn/article/142479/-إلى-نحتاج-غربية-بن-مهدي
التنمية-في-المساهمة-على-وحفزه-المدني-بالمجتمع-العالقة-مأسسة
Rabaoui, Mohammed Salih. 2017. “Mehdi Ben Gharbia: Associations are Required to Disclose
Their Sources of Funding Within a Month or…” [  الجمعيات مطالبة بكشف مصادر تمويلها:مهدي بن غربية

72

...]في اجل أقصاه شهر وإال. Assabah News. http://www.assabahnews.tn/article/152825/-غربية-بن-مهدي
واال-شهر-أقصاه-أجل-في-تمويلها-مصادر-بكشف-مطالبة-الجمعيات
Strauss, Anselm., and Juliet Corbin. 1990. Basics of Qualitative Research. Sage Publications.
Strauss, Anselm L. 1987. Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Strauss, Anselm., and Juliet Corbin. 1996. Grounded theory: Grundlagen qualitativer
Sozialforschung [Grounded theory: basics of qualitative social research]. Weinheim: Psychologie
Verlags Union.
“Study on Civil Society Organization in Tunisia”. 2013. Foundation for The Future.
http://foundationforfuture.org/en/Portals/0/Publications/Etude%20SC%20english%20Version%2
0Finale.pdf
Teppo, Anne R. 2015. "Grounded Theory Methods." In Approaches to Qualitative Research in
Mathematics Education, eds. Bikner-Asbah, Angelica, Knipping Christine, Presmeg, Norma.
Springer, Dordrecht. 3-21.
“Tunisian Minister’s Surprise Resignation.” https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180716tunisian-ministers-surprise-resignation/ (Accessed July 10th, 2020).
“Tunisian Civil Society: From Revolutionaries to Peacekeepers.” World Bank
https://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/tunisian-civil-society-revolutionaries-peace-keepers
(October 15, 2015).
Reuters. 2020. “Timeline: Tunisia’s Rocky Road from Revolution to Democracy”
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-politics-timeline/timeline-tunisias-rocky-road-fromrevolution-to-democracy-idUSKCN24G2SU. (July 15, 2020).
Vollstedt, Maike., and Rezat, Sebastian, eds. 2019. An Introduction to Grounded Theory with
a Special Focus on Axial Coding and the Coding Paradigm. In: Kaiser G., Presmeg
Compendium for Early Career Researchers in Mathematics Education. ICME-13
Monographs. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15636-7_4.
Yerkes, Sarah, and Ben Yahmed Zeined. 2019. “Tunisia’s Political System: From Stagnation to
Competition.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 28, 2019.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/03/28/tunisia-s-political-system-from-stagnation-tocompetition-pub-78717 (January 10, 2020).
Yerkes, Sarah. 2019. “Tunisia’s Elections, Explained: The World’s Youngest Democracy
Votes.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/tunisian-elections-2019. (August 10,
2020).

73

CHAPTER 4: Decree Number 88 explained from Advocacy Coalition Framework
Perspective
Introduction
As the only Arab Spring nation to successfully achieve democratization, many scholars
and Tunisian leaders alike credit the strength of Tunisia’s civil society with its successful Arab
Spring outcome (Ben Hassine, 2018; Boose, 2013; Deane, 2013). Notably, one of the early laws
enacted by Tunisia’s new democratic leadership was Decree Number 88, a policy designed to
regulate civil society organizations (CSOs) while allowing them to thrive. Decree Number 88
establishes rules for how CSOs can operate, guidelines for their interactions with other CSOs,
and reporting requirements for financial activities (Decree Number 88, 2011). While my research
recognizes the positive impact of Tunisia’s vibrant civil society on its successful democratic
transition and ongoing democratic consolidation, my observations of many CSOs’ noncompliance with Decree Number 88 leads me to conclude that continued non-compliance leads
to a situation in which the CSOs could be operating in ways that undermine Tunisian democracy
– in some cases intentionally, in others, unintentionally. Moving forward, unless Decree Number
88 is either enforced or altered to prevent it from being circumvented, we will continue to
observe more negative impacts of CSO operation.
Applying Advocacy Coalition Framework will provide a better understanding of Decree
Number 88, and particularly why it has remained unchanged despite growing non-compliance
among the CSOs the decree aims to regulate. The Advocacy Coalition Framework’s component
factors, including “policy subsystems, belief systems, deep core, policy core, and secondary
aspects” are particularly applicable to Tunisia’s political landscape (Sabatier and Weible, 2007
p.200). Viewed through the lens of Advocacy Coalition Framework, the main obstacle to
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changing Decree Number 88 is overcoming both the conflict and cooperation between
government institutions and political parties. Policy change is highly unlikely from the
governance side because few ministries would benefit from a change. At the same time, political
parties control most ministries in Tunisia, and they have their own incentive structures. While
political parties may be motivated to improve the law’s enforcement, this goal is simultaneously
disincentivized by the drive to avoid any appearance of stifling CSO activity, or civil society
more broadly, which could present electoral challenges in future elections.
Since Advocacy Coalition Framework was first developed to deal with intense public
policy problems, it is suitable here to explain the lack of change in Decree 88 (Hoppe and
Peterse, 1993). If we examine the stasis of the decree from a policy perspective, we understand
that a number of actors such as those involved in government institutions, interest groups, and
media, along with social and political activists, are in dispute regarding the law. Individuals in
some government institutions insist that the law should remain unchanged because they fear that
new restrictions would result in the closure of hundreds of non-compliant organizations. This
fear, while a direct result of the belief that operational autonomy of CSOs should always be
preserved in order to reap the pro-democracy benefits of civil society, is actually misguided:
within Decree Number 88 is a requirement that non-compliant organizations are issued a
warning before any disciplinary action is initiated. This clause shields well-intentioned but noncompliant CSOs from being shut down by the government. Legally, this provides a legal buffer
that benefits all CSOs. Conversely, individuals in other government institutions such as the
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior do believe that Decree 88 is causing problems
and should be changed or completely replaced. In 2017, Prime Minister Youssef Chahed issued a
strong statement asserting the need to monitor CSO funds (Nadhif, 2017).
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Pressing for changes in Decree 88, advocacy coalitions try to persuade government
institutions to behave “in accordance” with their policy objectives, while government
institutions, if following the constitutional structure, would gradually implement more
restrictions on CSOs through “guidance instruments” provided by the advocacy coalition
(Sabatier and Pelkey, 1987). If the Prime Ministry is serious about seeing a change in Decree 88,
several steps should be followed. First, a number of government positions, such as the Minister
of Government Relations with Civil Society, should be revised. Second, the government should
turn to the judiciary as the institution with the power to imbue implementation of the decree with
legitimacy. Third, the media as an independent institution could have an impact on policy change
by raising the issues associated with Decree 88, and in turn, the public awareness generated by
media coverage could influence policy makers to act.
Based on Tunisia’s current political environment, Advocacy Coalition Framework offers
a useful tool for conceptualizing a path to policy change via a coalition of government
institutions and other stakeholders that could create the conditions for passage of CSO regulatory
policy. Advocacy Coalition Framework provides a clear path for understanding Tunisia’s current
political environment, for instance, how and why CSOs’ activities may be used to undermine the
democratic institutional achievements that civil society helped to establish in the first place.
Advocacy Coalition Framework also offers a useful tool for conceptualizing a path to policy
change via a coalition of government institutions and other stakeholders that could create the
conditions for passage of improved CSO regulatory policy.
I begin this chapter by analyzing relevant literature and demonstrating how Advocacy
Coalition Framework explains the lack of change in CSOs policies. I then focus here on policy
subsystems, from functional and substantive dimensions, and present main policy participants. I
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conclude with discussing the drivers of policy stability in Tunisia and its implications on CSOs
policies.
Literature Review
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) deems the policy process to be the result of a set
of actors who compete to promote beliefs about policy problems and solutions. It supports a
system of causality and values in public policy (Sabatier, 1998). According to ACF, policy
subsystems constitute the variables responsible for influencing public policy, and these
subsystems present “a variety of cognitive biases” that provide assistance in complex situations
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).
A central component of this framework is the idea that “belief systems” are responsible
for structuring public problems and identifying how they should be dealt with. These belief
systems, held by individuals in the policy subsystem, consist of three main categories: a “deep
core,” which represents the deeply held, stable, and normative belief sets that provide a broad
perspective of policy dynamics, a “policy core,” which is typically resistant to change, but
provides ideal grounds for forming coalitions, and finally, a “set of secondary aspects,” that are
empirically based and the most likely to change (Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith, 1999). In the
framework, these three types of belief systems are responsible for stasis in public policy (Weible,
Sabatier, and McQueen, 2009), and therefore must be overcome to enact policy change.
ACF emphasizes the importance of three principles: first, policy change requires “a time
perspective of a decade or more” (Sabatier, 1988). Second, policy subsystems are crucial to
achieving policy change. Third, public policies can be “conceptualized” in the same way that
“belief systems” are (Sabatier, 1988). ACF conceives of public policy as a dynamic process that
relies mainly on variables such as alliances and fights. Viewed through the lens of ACF, the main
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issue to overcome with Decree Number 88 is the conflict between government institutions.
Political parties control most ministries in Tunisia, making a policy change highly unluckily
because few of the ministries would benefit from a change. According to ACF, Decree Number
88 would only be likely to change if government institutions were to reach a consensus. Such a
compromise is more likely to happen if the public becomes aware of the issue and pressures
representatives to make the change.
Policy change is one the most discussed topics in the field of public policy; questions
about the causal link between external events and policy change remains the topic of debate
among researchers. Advocacy Coalition Framework is a useful framework for the topic of
Decree Number 88 and Tunisia’s challenges to CSO regulatory policy because it is flexible
enough to accommodate this problem19, while parsimonious enough to simplify the complexity
of this problem.
Belief systems
A main approach of ACF is to spend a great amount of time studying the belief systems
of policy makers and analyzing the conditions that can result in policy-oriented learning
(Sabatier, 2007). When studying the Tunisian case, we find that there is consensus among
political elites regarding civil society organizations concerning the importance of CSOs’
collective role in further consolidating the Tunisian democratic process. These political and
economic elites (there is much overlap between these two sets) are generally opposed to
changing the law. This opposition works on multiple levels: on the surface, there is a component
of self-interest, as the elites are positioned to be the main benefactors of the current system. But
more consequential in terms of explaining policy stasis is the fact that these elites regard Decree
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Exchange of emails with Dr. Christopher Weible on 11 February 2020.
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Number 88 with a reverence that is indicative of their deep core belief around the policy’s value
as founding principle in Tunisian democracy (Ghali and Mnasri, 2016; Ghali, 2018; Belhassine,
2018). In their eyes, the health of the democracy is derivative of the health of Tunisia’s civil
society organizations; absence of the latter precludes the former. This is creating a conflict
between policy makers – the elected politicians, many of whom are drawn from this “elite” class
– and career bureaucrats who favor establishing an implementation mechanism that can hold
uncompiled CSOs accountable. Mr. Mahdi Ben Garbia, Minister of Relations with the
Constitutional Instances, Civil Society, and Human Rights stated in an interview with the Tunis
Afrique Press Agency that “the Tunisian state has no means to monitor the work of the 19,000
associations… and should revise the Decree-Law on associations enacted late September 2011”
(TAP, 2016).
The fact that the overriding consensus among Tunisian policy makers has been static
since democratization, now approaching a decade, not only indicates that initiating any policy
change regarding Decree Number 88 is difficult, but the continued stasis makes the current law
more entrenched. This dynamic in the Tunisian political system is consistent with ACF’s
underlying tenet that “the beliefs of policy participants are very stable over such a period”
(Weible, 2007). Germaine to this case, Weible (2007) emphasizes that achieving change can be
even more difficult in developing countries, elaborating that confounding factors such as
“instability of [the] political system” and “lack of trained personnel” can work against change in
specific policy areas (Weible, 2007, pp.192, 193).
In freshly minted democracies like Tunisia, succession of power often brings a rapid
turnover of political players, and this holds true of the Tunisian case. In the three rounds of
elections held thus far, parties that gained enough seats, winning the opportunity to form
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governments in 2011 and in 2014, had poor showings in the 2019 elections. The major parties
from the first two parliamentary results, Ennahdha Movement and Nidaa Tounes, both lost seats
and were largely replaced by new parties, of course, featuring new politicians, after the 2019
elections. This continual rotation of political leadership since democratization, and particularly
the high turnover of the most recent elections, has resulted in the emergence of a new cohort of
policy makers whose policy agendas differ markedly from their predecessors. The result is a
situation in which the bureaucrats and researchers who are interested in starting negotiations
with legislators to establish a viable implementation mechanism for Decree Number 88 usually
find themselves starting over with every election due to the rotation of political power every
election cycle. “Traditionally, policymaking has been conducted within a tight circle of senior
administration and government officials. Sometimes, it was driven by the special interests
associated with the senior political actors in the former regime” says Amiri, Kherigi (2015), who
makes the point that the fluctuations inherent in democratic power make it difficult to pass new
legislation, in contrast with the “old” way under authoritarian leadership. In short, this is the case
for why a working framework, such as ACF, is needed to guide the process efficiently.
Paradoxically, while some policies such as Decree Number 88 have remained in stasis,
the legislature in Tunisia’s nascent democracy has proven to be substantially dynamic; each
government since the 2011 revolution has been composed of multiple political parties with
different ideologies, the most recent made up of five political parties and independent figures
(Grewal, 2019). As one would expect, this has forced coalition-building and governance by
consensus. While ACF assumes that policy makers usually hold “strong beliefs” and tend to
convert those beliefs to policy, the particular political dynamic as it has played out in the
Tunisian case has proven to be particularly stagnant. The fundamental diversity of interests
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represented in Tunisian policymakers when they come to power renders it inherently difficult to
translate the various core belief sets to the policy agenda. And even when a new policy proposal
makes it onto the formal agenda, as a first step, it faces the even greater challenges of being
written into law and implemented (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963).
In practice, we observe that even while some candidates run on the promise of finding
solutions to the lack of effective regulation of Tunisia’s CSOs, this promise does not make it to
the parliamentary agenda due to the existence of other priorities such as unemployment and the
nation’s general economic malaise which has lasted for the duration of Tunisia’s democratic
project (Szakal, 2018). These observations are consistent with the framework, considering that
policymakers’ strong belief systems are one of the primary obstacles preventing policy change,
and should be overcome before introducing or amending policies (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,
1991).
Thus, the Tunisian case is supported by ACF and provides new evidence of the
framework’s efficacy, specifically by the observation that the framework holds in the Tunisian
context – as a new democracy and as a representative of Middle East and North African politics.
The following subsections break down the Tunisian case into the framework’s component
categories of belief systems: deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs, and secondary aspects.

Deep Core Beliefs. Deep core beliefs are one of the main tools that explain how human

values play out in human behavior. Often the deep core beliefs revolve around strongly rooted
basic principles such ‘liberty’ and ‘equality,’ for example. Weible argues that deep core beliefs
are the product of “childhood socializations” which make them exceedingly difficult to change
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007). In a political system, the traditional left versus right political

81

ideological paradigm operates at the deep core level (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Whether in a
first-past-the-post system with two main parties, or in a parliamentary democracy that has many
viable options along a left versus right spectrum, deep core beliefs are the foundational principles
that political parties are established on and that politicians compete to translate into actual
policies (Sabatier and Weible, 2007).
Following the 2011 uprising, the interim government established the Higher Authority for
the Realization of the Revolution’s Objectives, Political Reform and the Democratic Transition.
It served as an interim parliament in charge of amending the legal framework to lead the country
to its first “free, fair, transparent, and pluralistic” election (Nouira, 2011). The interim institution
was composed of representatives from political parties and civil society organizations, with
members were carefully selected to ensure a swift transition. Yadh Ben Achour, the head of this
Higher Authority, stated in an interview with Swissinfo “[w]e were in a revolutionary period, and
in such periods the law cannot fully govern reality; but neither can it be ignored, even in
revolutionary times” (Dhif, 2015). The main goal of Ben Achour was to issue legislation that
will break with autocratic practices, consolidate the democratic process, and guide the country to
its first free democratic elections. Decree Number 87, pertaining to regulate political parties, and
Decree Number 88, pertaining to regulate civil society organizations, were two of the first
outcomes of the Higher Authority for the Realization of the Revolution’s Objectives, Political
Reform, and Democratic Transition.
In 2011, the Higher Authority for the Realization of the Revolution’s Objectives, Political
Reform, and Democratic Transition passed 130 decrees in a period of 10 months, 40 of which
addressed democracy and human rights issues. Decree Number 88 was one of the main
achievements of the Higher Authority; technical committees including a team of constitutional
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experts, representatives of the United Nations Development Program, representative of the
International Center for Not-for-Profit law, representatives of local organizations, and
representative of the Kawakibi Democratic Transition Center took part in the drafting process
(Ghali, 2018).
Because of the fundamental nature of these laws and their strong, widespread, support
from people across Tunisia’s political spectrum – including by citizens who describe themselves
as “non-political” – the decrees are broadly considered by Tunisian citizens to be symbolic of the
revolution and so foundational to Tunisia’s democracy that they can not be changed (Schäfer,
2015). This is evidenced by the public’s swift and negative reaction to any suggestion of
changing the laws, such as when the Minister in charge of Relations with Constitutional
Institutions and Civil Society, Mehdi Ben Gharbia, spoke publicly of the need to reform Decree
Number 88 and was met with overwhelming criticism that was widely reported (Atwi, 2018).
The deep core belief that civil society is the precursor to – and sustainer of – democracy,
public reaction to any suggestion of changing Decree Number 88 reveals that this core belief is
generally conflated with a perception that policies that protect civil society are infallible and
immutable in Tunisian public perception. The popular perception that these laws are
foundational makes it difficult to reform the laws, even to close loopholes or prevent misuse,
which would ultimately be better for democratic consolidation. A survey conducted in 2011 by
the International Republican Institute shows that the majority of Tunisian citizens approved of
the transitional commission; around 60% of Tunisians were very confident or somewhat
confident in the commission’s work especially in the field of political reform and Human Rights
(IRI, 2011). Because CSO support was a centerpiece of the transitional government’s work, this
survey provides further indication that the emphasis on CSO viability is an issue that most
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Tunisians strongly favored: 77% of respondents believed that independent civil society has
improved since the uprising. Surveys such as this one and other news stories reported in the
national media explain how pro-CSO policy, such as Decree Number 88, is inextricably tied to
the validity of Tunisia’s new democratic government in the eyes of many people (Aswad, 2017;
Abd Ellatif, 2018; Mouna; 2018). From this, we see that any move to inhibit or alter Decree
Number 88 constitutes a challenge to the deep core belief that CSO activity is infallible (Abd
Almouli, 2013).
In addition to civilian reactions that reveal the deep core nature of public perception
regarding Decree Number 88, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS) in
collaboration with a local organization, My Organization []جمعيتي, and the Kawakibi Center for
Democratic Transitions conducted a study about civil society organization in Tunisia; in the final
report, one of the authors stated “Decree 88 is considered one of the best association laws in the
world and certainly one of the best in countries in Transition” (Ghali, 2018).
My research shows that this fundamental belief in the absolute need for Decree Number
88 is also held by people who work in Tunisia’s political sphere, including both politicians and
CSO leaders. I conducted 15 interviews. Six of them were with government officials,
administrative workers, and members of political parties. I also conducted seven interviews with
members of civil society organizations, and two interviews with public figures who have an
understanding of Decree Number 88. When asked about their opinion regarding Decree Number
88, 92% of participants stated that Decree Number 88 is a revolutionary decree, which plays a
primary role in strengthening civil society organization in Tunisia. Of the population sampled,
61% of participants believe that Decree Number 88 is revolutionary and should not be changed;
31% of participants believe that Decree Number 88 is revolutionary, but it could be improved or
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replaced; 6% didn’t have an opinion regarding the Decree. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 depict
participant demographics according to career or official position. Figure 4.2 provides a visual
illustration of participant beliefs regarding Decree Number 88.

Table 4.1: Participant Responses to Decree Number 88
Interviews

Believe that Decree

Believe that Decree

Did not have an

88 is revolutionary

88 is revolutionary,

opinion

and shouldn’t be

but it should be

changed

changed or altered

4

2

0

4

2

1

Public Figures

2

0

2

Total

15

15

15

Government Official,
administrative workers,
and members of
political parties
Members of Civil
Society Organizations
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Participants by Category

13%
40%

Public Official
CSOs
Public Figures

47%

Figure 4.1: Participants by Category
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Percentage of Total Participants
8%

31%
61%

Prefer Maintaining Decree 88

Prefer Improving/Replacing Decree 88

No Opinion

Figure 4.2: Preferences on Decree Number 88

In an interview, a representative of the Tunisian Charity Organizations stated “Decree
Number 88 is what protects civil society organizations in Tunisia from old government practices.
We have to understand that administrative workers were trained on implementing previous laws,
they think that way, the only reason they are not shutting down organizations is Decree Number
88. My organization has been shut down by these administrative workers and I used Article 4 of
Decree Number 88 to take them to court and we are winning the case. If it was not for Decree
88, there wouldn’t be any legal procedure we can do.”20
In another interview with a member of Ennahdha Movement’s Shura Council, the
political party’s consultative body, Hatem Boulabyar stated “Decree Number 88 is a great piece
of legislation, it came right after the revolution and provided Tunisians with the freedom to
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Personal Interview with a representative of Tunisian Charity Organization, August 8th, 2016.
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establish CSOs without any restrictions. It was the first step to ensur[ing] the strengthening of the
democratic process. It is one of the initial Decrees that guided Tunisia to Democracy, it is a
revolutionary Decree if you compare it with the previous legislations [sic].”21 The perspectives
conveyed by the CSO representative and the political party member both reflect the deep core
belief that Decree Number 88 is “revolutionary,” inextricably tied to Tunisia’s democratic
transition.
Decree Number 88 has become eponymous for a constellation of related deep core beliefs
because this single law incorporates support for several related components that were critical for
Tunisia’s post-revolution success in establishing a democracy, including ideals such as citizen
autonomy from government, civil society’s ability to hold government accountable, and the
admiration for civil society’s role in securing Tunisia’s democratic transition, particularly during
a time when democratic consolidation was not a forgone conclusion. In this regard, the unique
awarding of the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize to the Tunisian Dialogue Quartet (discussed in the
previous chapter) provided further support for crediting CSOs as being foundational to
successful democratization, as did the alternative outcome experienced by other “Arab Spring
nations” such as Egypt, where the failure to democratize is often attributed to the absence of
strong civil society (Hoyle, 2019). Thus, these ideals are deep core beliefs that people regard to
be critical to both founding and continuation of Tunisian democracy.
Finally, the widely held convictions that vibrant civil society is responsible for Tunisia’s
democratic achievement, that the continued health of Tunisia’s civil society organizations is
critical for furthering the nation’s democratic consolidation, and that nothing should be allowed
to interfere with – or even create the perception of interference with – the operation of CSOs, are
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Personal Interview with Hatem Boulabyar, Ennahdha Movement, August 3 rd, 2016.
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all baked into Decree Number 88, making the law’s name a useful stand-in that policymakers
and even private citizens use when describing their own convictions, which ACF would label
“deep core beliefs.”
Before the revolution, Tunisian policy makers who opposed Zine el Abidine Ben Ali’s
regime were forced to spend the prime years of their political careers in exile for such political
infractions; after the revolution, many of these political dissidents returned to Tunisia to help
craft and ultimately guide Tunisia’s nascent democracy. The individual experiences of these
political operatives within the former authoritarian system, along with their experiences of
participation in Tunisia’s democratic transition, were highly formative in shaping their deep core
beliefs around the underpinnings of a successful democracy (Karrou, 2014). Specifically, the
central role that CSOs played in democratic transition and democratic consolidation has led such
activists and politicians to believe strongly that CSOs play a critical in democratic consolidation.
In the context of these deep core beliefs, it follows that any proposal designed to regulate CSO
activity is considered with skepticism at the very least, and most likely will never make it to the
official agenda for legislative consideration because it is seen as hampering civil society (Alawi,
2020).
The deep core belief in the incontestable importance of CSO activity to democracy is
reflected in additional personal statements made by participants during interviews for this
research. To this point, Kamel Jandoubi, the Minister in charge of Relations with Constitutional
Institutions and Civil Society, stated “Decree Number 88 completely changed the methods used
by the old regime in dealing with civil society organizations. The previous system was based on
a prior authorization system, which we got rid of, and we established a simple declaration
system, which represent a paradigmatic shift; it also represents a psychological, political, and
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administrative shift in Tunisia.”22 In another interview with a local newspaper, Al-Sabah, he
declared “We are committed to maintaining and strengthening the freedom provided by Decree
Number 88 to CSOs after the revolution. This freedom given to associations is as important to
democracy as freedom of speech” (Sabah News, 2015).
The Higher Authority for the Realization of the Revolution’s Objectives, Political
Reform, and Democratic Transition was composed of twelve political parties, twenty
associations, prominent national figures, and representative of the Tunisian General Labor Union
(UGTT) (UNDP, 2013). The freedom to establish political parties and civil society organizations
was one of the first discussion topics; Yadh Ben Achour expressed that he was highly impressed
by the civic activism Tunisian citizens showed during the transitional period and wanted to
protect this this right. In an interview with UNDP, Souhayr Belhassen, previous president of the
International Federation of Human Rights and one of the major opposition voices to Ben Ali,
stated “For the first time, civil society was playing an active role in law-making. It was a driving
force behind the main texts staking out the path to democracy during this initial period of the
transition: historic decree-laws such as the one that created the first Independent High Authority
for Elections, the one on the organization of the first free and open elections in Tunisia, those
concerning the organization of associations, political parties and freedom of the press, and the
one on the media which created the sector's first independent regulatory authority (INRIC)”.23
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Phone Interview with Kamel Kandoubi, Minister of Relations of Constitutional Bodies, Civil Society, and
Human Rights, on November 11, 2016 in Tunis, Tunisia.
23 United Nations Development Program. 2013. The Civil Society in the Transition: Interview with Souhayr
BelHassen.
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/Compendium%20English/Part%202/19%20BELHASSEN%20EN
.pdf (August 3, 2020).
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Civil society’s role in consolidating the Tunisian democratic process is an example of
deep core belief that Tunisian policy makers agree on. Therefore, the challenge when
approaching this topic of Decree Number 88 in Parliament will be to delineate the difference
between legislative support for civil society organizations versus regulatory actions that by
establishing uniform operating rules will bolster the long-term fidelity of these organizations.
Mr. Mehdi Ben Gharbia, the Minister of Relations of Constitutional Bodies, Civil Society, and
Human Rights, announced in 2016 that his ministry was working with several local and
international organizations “on revising Decree Number 88 in order to keep the freedom it gave
to CSOs and make it compatible with the 2014 constitution…[We] will conduct a broad
consultation with CSOs to reach a consensus about the revisions, which will preserve freedom of
associations and provide new opportunities for civil society (Al Sabah News, 2016). In 2017, he
announced that after a careful evaluation of Decree Number 88, his ministry concluded that it
lacks a clear implementation mechanism and should be completely replaced. He announced that
a new draft law would be introduced in the first quarter of 2018 (Al-Sabah News, 2017). In 2018,
Mr. Ben Gharbia stated “The new draft law was supposed to be introduced in the first quarter of
2018; however, it was delayed allowing more consultation with CSOs. . . There is pressure from
the international community regarding the draft law we are working on. Many organizations
showed concerns about losing the freedoms obtained by Decree Number 88, however, we are
working in a participatory and consultative manner with all national and international partners to
address these concerns” (Abd-Ellatif, 2018).
After the European Commission added Tunisia to its list of “High Risk” countries for
money laundering and terror financing in February 2018 (Yerks, 2018), the intergovernmental
Financial Action Task Force issued a report “urging authorities to expedite the implementation
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of measures related to the development of a commercial register system” (FATA, 2017). Even
though the report clearly attributes money laundering to the lax oversight of civil society
organizations, the Tunisian government stopped short of introducing any changes to Decree
Number 88 itself. Instead of altering the existing decree in order to comply with FATA’s
recommendations, Tunisian legislators proposed an entirely new piece of legislation, officially
titled Draft Law 30 of 2018. This new law requires both public and private companies, including
civil society organizations, to register with the National Registration Institution.
This proposed Draft Law 30 has problems of its own, as many small organizations do not
have the expertise to implement the requirements of the new Draft Law, yet failure to do so can
result in expensive fines and even jail time. Human Rights Watch immediately declared this step
as “a latest sign of authoritarian resurgence” and described the new decree as unconstitutional
because it contradicts the 2014 Constitution and the existing Decree Number 88 (Fassihian,
2018). Other stakeholders, wary that the increased oversight would be used as a means of
disempowering their organizations, argued that politicians may employ the report as a pretext to
a crackdown on CSOs. To counteract the measures of Draft Law 30 of 2018, leaders representing
a broad alliance of CSOs recruited politicians to create a coalition in Parliament including all the
major political parties for the purpose of lobbying against any form of government restriction of
CSO activity as a response to the FATA report.
In a move that surprised many because it ran counter to the popular opposition to Draft
Law 30, the Minister of Civil Society, Mehdi Ben Gharbia, made a public statement in
Parliament arguing in favor of including civil society organizations in the proposed law. Ben
Gharbia’s surprise endorsement of Draft Law 30 as written led to passage of the law on July 27,
2018 that, in fact, included CSOs (Szakal, 2018). Ben Gharbia’s staff claimed this action as a
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political victory, stating in a media interview with Middle East Monitor that they consider this a
win even though the change did not affect the Decree Number 88. Despite the fact that Decree
Number 88 remained unchanged with the passage of Law Number 30, Ben Gharbia’s statement
before Parliament in support of including CSOs within Law Number 30 led to widespread
criticism aimed at the minister himself. Shortly after this, Ben Gharbia submitted his resignation,
citing the lack of any tangible reform as the main reason for his decision. (Middle East Monitor,
2018). The chain of events surrounding Ben Gharbia’s support for Draft Law 30 and the antiCSO optics associated with this backing demonstrates the political hazards of challenging a deep
core belief set – without the consensus of an advocacy coalition; in Ben Gharbia’s case,
accomplishing little on the policy end while leading to his resignation as minister.
Following Ben Gharbia’s resignation and the ratification of Law 30, thirty MPs along
with the support of several civil society organizations argued that including CSOs within the new
law is unconstitutional because it conflicts with Article 65. This vocal opposition elevated the
matter to the Interim Constitutional Court (Szakal, 2018). Interested parties from outside Tunisia
also took notice of this law; international organizations including Human rights Watch and
Freedom House declared Law 30 of 2018 a threat to civil liberties and condemned it for having
the potential to create a “slow democratic backslide” (Fassihian, 2018).

Policy Core Beliefs. Policy researchers such as Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith define policy

core beliefs as the essential choices and “basic attributes” that determine policies. According to
the framework, the stability of policy core beliefs is a result of many factors, namely these
factors stem from a link to the deeply entrenched nature of the deep core beliefs, discussed
above. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith contend that participants in the policymaking process often
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translate their deep beliefs into policy beliefs, which imbues these policies with a fundamental,
or essential, nature, making the policy core beliefs difficult to overcome when attempting to
change course on a policy issue (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). This leads to a tendency
toward status quo when it comes to the policy core beliefs should be taken into consideration
when attempting to overcome policy inertia in order to enact legislative change.
Advocacy Coalition Framework suggests that policymakers can take advantage of
opportunities such as the presence of similar policy core beliefs among “legislators, agency
officials, interest group leaders, judges, researchers, and intellectuals from multiple levels of
government” by translating the similarities in belief systems into actual policies that are
amenable to all. Another aspect of policy core beliefs emerges when participants in the
policymaking process assume that their opponents will take advantage of the same opportunities,
a phenomenon which Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith call the “devil shift” (1999). In this type of
interaction, stakeholders present (and actually perceive) opponents as being less trustworthy and
even “evil,” a categorization which, once made, tends to exacerbate conflict among opponents
(Sabatier, Hunter, and McLaughlin, 1987; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). When Mehdi Ben
Gharbia, Minister for Government Relations with Constitutional Bodies, Civil Society, and
Human Rights and member of Nidaa Tounes, the largest parliamentary block in 2014, proposed
changes to CSOs policies. Other parliamentary blocks opposed his proposal believing it was
intended to weaken organizations monitoring the work of government and benefit his party. Ben
Gharbia submitted his resignation and blamed the opposition for his failure to introduce any
tangible changes (Bouzizi, 2018).
Policy core beliefs strengthen stakeholder relations within coalitions and encourage the
stakeholders to coordinate in order to reach shared policy goals. From this point on, the benefit is
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that they will primarily deal with the fundamental policy choices, which makes the subsequent
coordination more predictable in terms of coordination. Additionally, once this stage is reached,
the newly derived policy is sound, and typically very difficult to change (Weible, 2005).
There is currently a conflict that exists between the Central Bank, Ministry of Justice,
Ministry of the Interior, Parliament; and the Ministry of Relations with the Constitutional
Instances, Civil Society, and Human Rights; all of whom have a material stake in what happens
with Decree Number 88 and whether it is implemented. Significantly, many of these
stakeholders have an even greater stake in the public perception of CSO regulation, whether they
– either as entities or as individuals – are perceived to be supporting civil society activity or
hindering it. Thus, using policy to answer the question of ‘who’ has jurisdiction over civil
society organizations and can reprimand them for illegal activities is not only important in terms
of actual implementation, but also in terms of the optics of implementation. And herein lies the
opportunity for all of these Tunisian stakeholders: the possible pitfalls that would likely be borne
by many of these stakeholders in the case of policy change could be utilized as a commonality
when calling upon the various groups to establish a coalition – distributing the burden among
policy makers, bureaucrats, judges, researchers, and politicians in conjunction with a proposal
for a clear implementation mechanism.

Secondary Aspects. According to ACF, the third type of belief system that explains

change in public policy is the category “secondary beliefs” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007).
Secondary beliefs are “narrow in scope” and can easily open negotiation channels among
coalitions. Policy makers tend to reach consensus or completely abandon a secondary aspect at
the expense of preserving a policy core belief or deep core belief system, so changing secondary

95

beliefs is less difficult and requires “fewer agreements” among subsystems (Sabatier and Weible,
2007).
As mentioned in the previous sections, support for Decree Number 88 is considered a
“Deep Core Belief” which makes it very hard to change. However, the sub laws dealing with the
implementation mechanism are considered “Secondary Aspects” so it is possible that the
threshold for changing them could be reached much more easily. Decree Number 88 is still
considered a revolutionary law in the sense that it was created post-revolution, and it is often
viewed as being an important component of Tunisia’s successful democratic consolidation, so
many politicians will oppose any discussion about changing it. However, if the recommended
changes are presented as the solution, and the only clear path to preservation of the law itself, it
is plausible that many of these stakeholders will become open to new legislation. An
acknowledgement that the most viable way to ensure Decree Number 88’s longevity is to
strengthen the law, it thus could allow these policymakers to conceive of reforms as being
compatible with their strongly held deep core beliefs. Based on belief sets that prioritize the
preservation and strengthening of Decree Number 88, policy makers will reach an agreement and
establish an implementation mechanism. Advocacy Coalition Framework provides a particularly
effective strategy for navigating a path forward in this case, where core beliefs are also
influenced by the need for stakeholders to uphold a certain “appearance” in order to maintain
credibility (and re-electability).
The Ministry of Relations with the Constitutional Instances, Civil Society, and Human
Rights have been coordinating with civil society organizations, research institutions, and policy
makers on the possibility of amending Decree Number 88 but has thus far failed to achieve
meaningful results. What we have observed about Decree Number 88 in the context ACF, with
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acknowledgement of the three categories of belief systems and how stakeholders are beholden to
beliefs, is that the Ministry Relations with the Constitutional Instances, Civil Society, and
Human Rights fails because it continues to approach its objective of change by targeting the
decree head on, rather than using a tactics of appealing to fundamental beliefs and finding the
foundation for coalition building therein, as Advocacy Coalition Framework would suggest.
Stakeholder Analysis of Decree Number 88

Using Advocacy Coalition Framework to conduct a stakeholder analysis, I find that the
policy’s stasis is largely attributable to the variables of firm stakeholder belief sets and the moral
hazard of personal or institutional interests in which stakeholders benefit from the status quo,
while fearing harm if the status quo were to be disrupted. As ACF predicts, these dynamics
surrounding interests and beliefs promote policy stasis, while the institutional conflict caused by
the lack of implementation presents real risks to Tunisia’s ongoing democratic consolidation.
The rest of this article will apply the framework to the tasks of evaluating the strategies,
coalitions, and circumstances that could lead to policy stability, and will conclude with
recommendations that will allow policy change.
When analyzing policy stability and change in post-revolution Tunisia, the political
system seems very dynamic. Since 2011, Tunisia’s semi-presidential parliamentary system
witnessed eleven major government changes, which has led to corresponding swings in public
opinion. Notably, the electorate’s views have shifted from consensus to political opposition in
only few years (Grewal, 2019). Such a rapidly evolving political landscape not only results in
change of political leadership. It also produces new priorities for policymakers, pushing
articulated policy objectives to the end of the agenda.
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The main challenges facing the country of Tunisia since the revolution are corruption,
unemployment, regional socioeconomic disparities, and terrorism (Yerkes and Yahmed, 2019).
These priorities have been the sole focus of every government, yet there has been little to no
tangible change toward any of these legislative objectives. The lack of implementation of Decree
Number 88 falls within two of the challenges: corruption and terrorism. Policy makers such as
Youssef Chahed, Prime Minister from 2016 to 2019; Kamel Jandoubi, Minister of Relations with
the Constitutional Instances, Civil Society, and Human Rights from 2015 to 2016; and Mahdi
Ben Gharbia, Minister of Relations with the Constitutional Instances, Civil Society, and Human
Rights from 2016 to 2018 each acknowledged at different points in time that the lack of
regulation in CSOs is causing corruption, misuse of funds, and direct links to terrorist
organizations – and each has also acknowledged that although problematic, regulatory change to
Decree Number 88 has never made it to the policy agenda for a variety of reasons. (Jandoubi,
2015; Nadhif, 2017; Szakal, 2018)
Figure 4.3 depicts Tunisia’s eleven different governments over the corresponding
timeline of eight years. Even though four of these governments were reached through elections,
the remaining seven were formed through consensus, as politicians recognized the fragile
political situation and cooperated to maintain the peaceful democratic process. Kubinec and
Grewal (2018) argue that despite the benefits of including cross-cutting partnerships in the
coalitions, such as representatives of unions, there has also been a downside to the consensus
governance. Namely, the heavy reliance on coalitions has resulted in a weak or even absent
political opposition and has eliminated any real policy discussion (Kubinec and Grewal, 2018).
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Figure 4.3: Tunisian Governments since 2011
Stakeholders benefiting from Decree Number 88

The Tunisian political landscape in the years since the Jasmine Revolution is both
complex and constantly evolving. In 2011, several decrees including the Decree Number 88 were
issued without considering the government infrastructure and its ability to implement these
decrees successfully. These decrees were soon confirmed into laws in the spirit of the consensus
the country was going through, even though they lacked any enforcement mechanism.
Decree Number 88 shifted the authority of establishing new organizations from the
purview of the Ministry of Interior to the that of the Prime Ministry. This shift to being in the
hands of the executive was designed to signal to the international community that the country
had moved away from police state authoritarian practices of the past, in favor of modern
democratic delineation of powers and implementation of legislation. However well-intentioned
this move was, the members of Parliament did not evaluate the implications of this shift.
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When civil society organizations used to be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Interior, the ministry had all the needed manpower and experience to conduct the necessary
regulatory functions, including the ability to coordinate with other government institutions in
cases of violations to accomplish enforcement actions. When the shift happened, the Prime
Ministry established a new office and transferred one employee, Mr. Adel Soltani, formerly of
the Ministry of Interior, to head the new department responsible for CSO regulation. Mr. Adel
Soltani stated “Decree Number 88 was established with a concerning urgency accompanied with
a major lack of implementation mechanism.” 24 He explained that the “Spirit of the Decree” was
“to facilitate the establishment of civil society organizations and empower them to play a major
role in monitoring the government,” 25 again illustrating the deep core nature of this law.
Sultani’s views of the “spirit of the decree” are consistent with the finding that empowerment of
civil society generally, and protection of CSO activity in particular, is considered to be a sacred
function of government in Tunisia’s new democratic project.
The main stakeholders that hold influence over the Tunisian policymaking process are
political parties and elements of civil society. Islamists are represented by several political
parties, including Ennahdha Movement as the largest among them, and secular interests are also
represented by multiple political parties, with the major parties being Call for Tunisia [] نداء تونس,
Long Live Tunisia [] تحيا تونس, and Heart of Tunisia [ ] قلب تونس. Civil society organizations,
including organizations such as the Tunisian General Labor Union and the Tunisian
Confederation of Industry, Trade, and Handicraft, which collectively won the 2015 Nobel Peace
Prize for their “decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia in the
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Personal Interview with Ala Sultani on August 26, 2016 in Tunis, Tunisia.
Personal Interview with Ala Sultani on August 26, 2016 in Tunis, Tunisia.
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wake of the Jasmine Revolution of 2011” (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2015). A final
stakeholder faction that exercises substantial authority is the media, including traditional forms
such as radio and television media, as well as a new generation of highly influential bloggers and
influencers.
Over the decade since democratic transition occurred, Tunisian political parties and
several civil society organizations leveraged the absence of the regulatory laws to receive foreign
funds with complete impunity. Dr. Khalil Amiri, Deputy Minister for Scientific Research warned
that “civil society organizations present a ground for foreign influence…it is illegal for a foreign
government to interfere in local political process, however, through civil society, we can see
such influence, even within elections.” 26 While foreign influence in national elections has been
widely documented as a global problem, in the Tunisian case, there is easy access to foreign
influence via the unregulated financial flows that funnel into national politics via CSOs. Shoring
up this access point would constitute a major step in preventing illegal foreign influence in
Tunisian politics.
Political parties such as Ennhadha Movement, The Heart of Tunisia, and others have
created organizations that are run directly by supporters of their parties and who receive funds on
their behalf. This is considered desirable by the political parties because it gives them the
flexibility to avoid the government restriction barring parties from receiving foreign funds while
it is also used by the parties to circumvent campaigns donation limits. Dr. Amiri also cautioned
that “many civil society organizations are actually political parties in disguise, basically, they are
operating as political parties but free of the rules and the framework that political parties should
abide with in real democracies.”27 Other political movements such us Live Tunisian and Kahlil

26
27

Skype Interview with Khalil Amiri, Deputy Minister for Scientific Research on May 23, 2020.
Skype Interview with Khalil Amiri, Deputy Minister for Scientific Research on May 23, 2020.
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Tounes established themselves first as civil society organizations conducting charity work, but
after becoming more politically active, later converted into to political parties. “During the
months that proceeded elections, it was impossible to stay away from advertisements run by Live
Tunisian or Khalil Tounes…millions of dinars were spent to what turned to be political
campaigns” (Yousfi, 2019). Another example of CSO conversion into politics is Olfa Etterass,
founder of Live Tunisian [ ”]عيش تونسيand the wife of a French millionaire, who repatriated to
Tunisia in 2018 ostensibly to start charity work through her own registered CSO. Through her
organization Eich Tounsi, Etterass legally raised millions of dollars (US) and used her
“philanthropic” organization as a platform to freely conduct her campaign outreach all over the
country. Six months prior to the fall 2019 elections, Etterass announced that “more than 400,000
Tunisians collected signatures and urged her to run for a political office” (Yousfi, 2019). She
then declared the formation of a new political party of the identical name as her charitable
organization, “Live Tunisian []عيش تونسي,” and formally announced that she would run for
parliamentary election (POMED, 2019).
Another representative example is the candidacy of Nabil Karoui, president of the
political party Heart of Tunisia. Karoui first established himself as a national-level political
player through the establishment of a charity organization named in honor of his deceased son.
“The Khalil Tounes Foundation [was established] in 2017 to fight poverty, the main theme of his
campaign” (France 24, 2019). After transitioning from CSO to political party Heart of Tunisia,
the party won the second largest parliamentary block in the fall 2019 elections and Karoui
himself became one of the final round candidates in the 2019 presidential elections. In both the
parliamentary and presidential elections, Karoui ran on the platform of his Khalil Tounes
Foundation; the de facto merger of the CSO and the political organization provided a financial
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advantage over other political parties while also bringing ideological credibility to his own
political party and candidacy.
The Institutional Conflict Caused by the Lack of Change
Advocacy Coalition Framework provides the opportunity to study the reasons behind
policy stability and change and identify the main stakeholders benefiting from the outcomes.
ACF presents the beliefs causing policy stability and explains the conflicts causing the lack of
change (Weible, 2007). However, the policy process in Tunisia differs from that of other
Western democracies in that policy formulation in Tunisia is usually limited to the Parliament
with minimal contribution from outside entities such as NGOs or research institutions. The
Tunisian Parliament is composed of several blocks and ideologies as illustrated in Figure 4.4
below:
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Figure 4.4: Tunisia’s 2019 Parliamentary Structure
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 201928

Through the lens of ACF, we assess why the pressing issues such as corruption within
civil society organizations and other nationally sensitive topics never make it to the official
parliamentary agenda for many reasons, despite being declared critical issues of high priority by
many members of the National Assembly. First, policy making in Tunisia is mainly a top-down

Yerkes, Sarah, and Ben Yahmed Zeined. 2019. “Tunisia’s Political System: From Stagnation to Competition.”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 28, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/03/28/tunisias-political-system-from-stagnation-to-competition-pub-78717, (January 10, 2020)
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process, where the government formulates new policies, then passes such legislative initiatives to
the Parliament for endorsement. Second, the most important national research institutions in
Tunisia, as well as many of the influential think tanks, are governmental funded, for instance: the
Center for Research and Social Studies is under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs,
the Institute of Competitiveness and Quantitative Studies is under the supervision of the Ministry
of Economy and Finance, and the Tunisian Institute for Strategic Studies is part of the
Presidency of the Republic (Amiri, Khrigi, 2015). Because of the origin of funding to these
institutions, as well as the organizational oversight, these institutions operate at the direction and
discretion of the government, which makes it difficult to address topics beyond its scope of
work. Third, government institutions such as the judiciary and the Ministry of Finance, which are
sometimes in charge of policy implementation, remain in nearly constant conflict with policy
makers (Mnasri, 2018).
This institutional tension between policymakers (i.e., members of parliament) and policyimplementers (i.e., an executive function shared between the Prime Minister’s office and the
Ministry of Finance) was created intentionally to serve as a mechanism of accountability and
reflects the deep core belief in support for a vibrant civil society via a system of checks and
balances that is modeled off of Western democratic institutions. However, there is a downside to
the institutional tension in that it leads to governmental gridlock, thus hindering implementation.
Decree Number 88, Article 39, Part 2 serves a case in point of the institutional tension
that inhibits implementation and that is central to the questions of policy impact on CSOs and
CSOs’ impacts on democracy (i.e. the possibility of negative impact on democracy due to CSO
financial instruments being intentionally leveraged for ill-intent, the possibility of negative
impact on democracy due to unintentional accounting failures by CSOs, and the possibility of
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stifling CSOs and thus oppressing democracy through poor policy) (Ghali and Amiri, 2018).
Decree Number 88, Article 39, Part 2 charges the Ministry of Finance with the task of creating a
codified set of accounting practices that can be applied objectively to all CSOs, referred to in this
subpart of Decree Number 88 as the “Accounting Standards for Associations.” 29 Article 39 of
Decree Number 88 further stipulates that if any organization fails to comply with the Finance
Ministry’s published standards, the case of the non-compliant CSO will be turned over to the
government’s Secretary General; whereupon the Secretary General must initiate actions outlined
in Chapter 8 of Decree Number 88, which are: 1) issue a warning to the non-compliant
organization, 2) suspend the activity of the organization based on a court order, and 3) send a
request for the Court of First Instance to dissolve the organization. Thus, there is an agency
tasked with creating standards, a requirement that non-compliant CSOs be reported to another
agency that is tasked with assigning warnings or punishments for non-compliance, and even a
list of escalating actions that will be initiated in the case of non-compliance.
Despite the clarity of the law, particularly in demarking boundaries for the Ministry of
Finance and the Secretary General, the Ministry of Finance has yet to codify the “Accounting
Standards for Associations” that the law calls for it to establish (Ghali and Mnasri, 2018). While
this is a power play that the Ministry of Finance uses to consolidate its own authority (without
set standards, Finance has the ability to leverage power through arbitrary decisions), the end
result is that no standard exists for CSO reporting compliance – so reporting, warnings, and even
punishments are inconsistent. This dynamic has generated lasting conflict that goes beyond the
Ministry of Finance and the Secretary General’s office, reaching other government institutions
such as the administrative courts, the Parliament, and even non-government actors such as
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Article 39, Decree Number 88 of 2011.
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research institutions. Notably, this kind of institutional gridlock is not uncommon in the
democratic traditions that served as blueprints for Tunisia’s system of governmental checks and
balances (Mnasri, 2018).
The Tunisia Charity Organization, to take one example, suffered the consequences of this
inconsistent regulation and overall institutional conflict. In 2016, the Ministry for Government
Relations with Constitutional Bodies, Civil Society, and Human Rights requested from the Court
of the First Instance to dissolve the organization based on its relationship to a terrorist
organization. The organization appealed the decision to the Administrative Court and won the
case. In a personal interview with a member of Tunisian Charity Organization, he stated “there is
a major miscommunication between government institutions. . . [they] requested from the Court
of First Instance to dissolve my organization for receiving funds from a Qatari organization. . .
they didn’t check if we are submitting our financial reports to the office of the Prime Ministry or
not, which we do, we have tracking numbers and copies of everything.” 30 In another personal
interview with Mouheb Garoui, executive president of IWatch organization, he confirmed the
existing institutional conflict and explained that this conflict is mainly a result of absence of
communication between different institutions and lack of knowledge of the existing legislations
“you cannot dissolve an NGO without having to send them a warning to fix the issue, for
example, if you find out that there is an NGO who is financing terrorism you cannot just dissolve
it or cease their assets without notifying them first, you cannot do this without a court order.” 31
Adding to the structural problems that hinder implementation has been ineffective calls
for research on how to reform the system. Some bureaucrats, judges, and even civil society
organizations have urged research institutions to conduct studies about civil society
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Personal interview with a member of the Tunisian Charity Organization, July 7 th, 2016.
Phone Interview with Mouheb Garoui, executive director of IWatch Organization, July 20 th, 2020.
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organizations and their connections to political campaigns, but they never empowered those
conducting studies with the free range to conduct their research needed to make meaningful
recommendations. In 2016, several organizations, including IWatch and Mourakiboun,
specifically called for a “census” to be rendered of CSO compliance in which they were hoping
that data would be collected not only regarding whether CSOs filed their budgets and registered
their organizational documents properly with the government, but they were also promoting the
idea that the government should at least audit a sample for long form analysis, to include types of
activity, places they operate, how they reach out to citizens for participation, and other useful
parameters to help researchers and ultimately government overseers to gain important insight
into how funding is used, and seek to be able to understand and predict the conditions for
compliance versus non-compliance (Kasmi, 2016). This type of analysis would also enable
targeted education and outreach to organizations that are out of compliance. This study never
materialized, which is likely due to the deep core belief system discussed above surrounding
CSO autonomy. In a personal interview with Achref Aouadi, president of IWatch organization,
he stated” reflected assessing their failure to raise such a census: “Decree Number 88 was a
revolutionary law for civil society; there was a lot of pressure, censorship, oppression on civil
society. . . it gave a lot of guarantees to civil society and limited the mechanisms of control of the
state over civil society. . . After a couple of years, I am seeing all the problems associated with
the decree law. . . the lack of implementation, you can tell that there are things that we can keep
and should keep, and there are things that we need to get rid of. . . there is room for
improvement. . . we tried to discuss with legislators the importance of researching this area, but
they don’t want to listen, it is a red line for them” 32
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Personal Interview with Achref Aouadi, president of IWatch Organization, August 2 nd, 2016.
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Corroborating this particular anecdote of a failed study, Amiri and Khrigi (2015) find that
any research that was commissioned was explicitly limited in scope, giving the plausible
reasoning that “state policy research institutes continue to feel that they are marginalized from
the policymaking process” (Amiri and Khrigi, 2015). Again, when there seems to be any
possible threat to the status quo embodied by the deep core belief structure that protects CSO
inviolability, the research objectives have been stymied by policymakers and other stakeholders
that hold those deep core beliefs.
Besides having limited financial resources and trained personnel, these research institutes
are only directed to conduct specific studies related to short-term economic solutions (Amiri and
Khrigi, 2015). Overall, the lack of coordination between policy makers, research institutions, and
government institutions is causing political parties monopolize control over the policy making
process, without the aid and input of public policy research, which further complicates the
reform of issues such as regulation of Decree Number 88, making it highly unlikely that such
issues will be introduced on the official agenda, or ever result in a parliamentary vote (Amiri and
Khrigi, 2015).
Institutional Conflict as a Threat to Democracy
Advocacy Coalition Framework provides a helpful lens through which we can understand
the political and institutional landscape affecting policy outcomes in Tunisia. First, we apply
ACF in order to produce a stakeholder analysis to explain “stakeholder behavior and policy
outcomes in intense political conflicts” (Sabatier and Weible, 2005). ACF provides 1) the
opportunity to present the policy issue and decide on who to include as a stakeholder, 2) the
beliefs associated to the policy issue and its ability to influence the policy, 3) motivation to form
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coalitions, 4) stakeholders’ resources and venues, and 5) the main factors behind policy stability
and change (Weible, 2007).
Even though the Tunisian political system is dynamic and complex, being composed of
multiple political parties, we also find that the policy process itself is limited to very few
stakeholders. Evaluating Decree Number 88 and analyzing the conflict it created within the last
decade provides us with an understanding to the main stakeholders benefiting from the stasis of
the policy. Over the past decade, many problems associated with the Decree Number 88
unfolded and it started creating challenges to the novice democratic process. Article 35 of
Decree Number 88 states “Associations are prohibited from accepting assistance, donations, or
grants from countries not linked with Tunisia by diplomatic relations, or from organizations
which defend the interests and policies of those countries” (Decree Number 88, 2011).
Additionally, Article 41 of Decree Number 88 states that “the association shall publish
information about the foreign assistance, donations and grants it receives and record its source,
value and purpose in one written media outlet and on the website of the association, if any,
within one month of the date of the decision to request or accept it. The association shall also
inform the Government Secretary General of the same in a registered letter with receipt
acknowledgement, within the same period” (Decree Number 88, 2011).
Although both articles clearly specify the reporting regulations that CSOs must follow,
the decree fails to mention the consequences if organizations fail to adhere. This failure to codify
a penalty for non-compliance, or any other form of enforcement mechanism, created a problem
of non-compliance. Achref Aouadi, President of IWatch Organization, the local representative of
International Transparency in Tunisia, mentioned in a personal interview “Decree 88 did help
creating civil society organizations, but after a couple of years, you can see the limits of the
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decree; it was pro-freedom to the point that did not mention accountability” 33. Once high
numbers of Tunisian CSOs chose not to follow the policy, this set up a new problem. In addition
to the non-reporting, this led to the institutional dilemma in which there is now conflict between
the judicial and executive branches of the government where the latter is not implementing the
rulings of the former.
One instance of this institutional conflict playing out is illustrated by a time that the
Administrative Court shut down a total of 83 organizations after receiving official complaints
from the Ministry of Relations with the Constitutional Instances, Civil Society, and Human
Rights. After processing a number of complaints from international organizations, the prime
minister’s office instructed the Appeals Court to evaluate the legality of shutting down the noncompliant organizations. Once the cases were reevaluated on appeal, the ability to operate freely
was reinstated for most of the organizations, even though they were operating without complying
with Decree Number 88 (Nadhif, 2017).
The Appeals Court’s decision to reinstate the violating organizations created the
opportunity for a coalition between legislative, executive, and judicial actors. Following the
ruling, the Prime Minister’s office, Appeals Court judges, and members of parliament from
various political parties became united in their conflict with the Administrative Court. This
coalition created a situation in which any implementation mechanism associated with civil
society organizations was viewed as an attempt to stymie democratic activity, and led to many
politicians, CSO leaders, and citizens to question the independence of the judiciary in Tunisia.
Complicating this event is the continued absence of a Constitutional Court. Although required by
Tunisia’s new constitution, attempts to seat judges on the Constitutional Court have failed by

33

Personal Interview with Achref Aouadi, president of IWatch Organization, August 2 nd, 2016.
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each of the governments, most recently the Tunisian Parliament attempted and again failed to do
so in 2019.
With this institutional backdrop, we find that political parties with the largest
parliamentary block are the main stakeholders set to benefit from the lack of change in Decree
Number 88. These large parties, notably Ennahdha Movement and Nidaa Tounes, continue to
receive international funds from foreign donors, which they use to run their local, regional, and
national campaigns (Marks, 2017). Financing and operating these campaigns through nongovernmental organizations will continue until regulation is put in place; the catch is that those
with the power to make the change are the main benefactors of non-compliance.
The second set of stakeholders benefiting from the lack of implementation mechanism in
Decree Number 88 are the international actors who are exploiting the lack of effective policy
implementation to funnel money through CSOs and into Tunisian politics in order to serve their
own ends. Part of the attraction to the international entities is rooted in Tunisia’s democratic
success as the only country in the region to have successfully achieved a lasting democratic
outcome after the Arab Spring. Because of this, many Western countries are pouring millions of
dollars into Tunisian politics in order to help consolidate the newly established democracy and
continue to stabilize the country (Hall, Peel, and Saleh, 2013). In this case, we see that some of
the foreign investment in Tunisian politics is well intentioned.
There are several reasons why a positive outcome for Tunisia’s continued democratic
consolidation is viewed by Western powers as being advantageous enough to warrant investment
in the project. This is particularly true because of Tunisia’s geographically strategic location:
First, based on proximity to Europe, the stability of Tunisia is viewed as an important bulwark
for protecting the stability of Europe (Badalic, 2019). Second, a democratic country with strong
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institutions is important for European security, as it can help fight illegal immigration and
terrorism, which represent two of the greatest challenges facing European governments today
(Burwell et al. 2016). Third, any restrictions imposed on civil society organizations can affect the
international NGOs present in Tunisia, many of which have been operating in Tunisia for years –
and long prior to the revolution. For these NGOs (many backed by the foreign governments in
which they are based), they naturally wish to continue the work they are doing, and reporting
requirements inhibit this activity at best, and at worst make it illegal (Klaas and Dirsus, 2018).
The regional dynamic is also emblematic of a heated regional divide – and one that has
far reaching international consequences as both sides have proxy relationships with powerful
nations around the globe. On one side of this divide, the main regional actors are Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates, both of whom consider the Arab Springs to be an existential
threat to their regimes. Because of this, the UAE and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have spent
millions of dollars in supporting the failure of Tunisia’s democratic project (Hall, Peel, and
Saleh, 2013). On the other side, Qatar and Turkey have demonstrated strong support for Tunisia
as a nascent democracy (Cherif, 2017). Both sides are using CSOs within Tunisia to fund their
supporters in Tunisian government, so any restriction action on financial funds will be a direct
threat to their ongoing engagement (Jandoubi, 2015).
Conclusion
Advocacy Coalition Framework explains the set of core ideas, causation, and beliefs in
public policy; it provides the opportunity to map coalitions and explain the interests linked to
them (Cerna, 2013). The public policy process in Tunisia is a top-down approach mainly
controlled by political parties. Additionally, while government research institutions do play a
role in setting the policy agenda, they only work on specific policies requested by the
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government. Other independent research institutions conduct and produce high quality policy
research that influence policy dialogues and establish a clear path to coalitions (Amiri and
Khrigi, 2015).
In 2011, The Higher Authority for the Realization of the Revolution’s Objectives,
Political Reform, and Democratic Transition passed several Decrees that are considered the
backbone of Tunisian Democracy. These new decrees which were established by the
technocratic transitional legislative institution and then coalition-led newly elected Constituent
Assembly after the ouster of longstanding authoritarian leader Zine el Abidine Ben Ali reflect
strongly held beliefs and desires of the people moving forward as a new democratic nation postrevolution, and much like the American Constitution, these beliefs are profoundly shaped by the
deep fears and distrust Tunisians have of authoritarian rule. Therefore, these deep beliefs are
baked into the new laws, making the decrees themselves difficult to change, even when it
becomes apparent through the test of time that the policies are not working entirely as planned.
In addition to the deep core belief system, there is policy core belief stability reflected in
these Decrees is a result of several factors: first, political parties benefit from the lack of
implementation of these policies. Second, any change is considered by many to threaten their
very existence in the political scene. Third, public policy research in Tunisia is new, and
primarily controlled by the government institutions they aim to study, which sets up a conflict of
interest in which the research results are usually beholden to influence of the politicians who
commissioned the work. Fourth, the lack of coordination between institutions and the absence of
data is creating a conflict among policy makers, as Amiri and Khrigi (2015, 9) assert “The state
policy research institutes interviewed cited difficulties in accessing public sector data from other
ministries. They complained of a lack of uniform system for sharing data across ministries or
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even within ministries”. Finally, the main legislative body in Tunisia is the Parliament, which
both benefits from and is harmed by the continual absence of a majority. Because it is so new,
Tunisia’s Parliament also has a dearth of experience in its elected officials, while the policy
agenda remains dominated by ongoing issues related to the aftermath of democratic transition,
such as economic development and unemployment.
Decree Number 88 is considered a revolutionary law and one of the pillars contributing to
ongoing democratic process. Even though the absence of regulatory laws to enforce compliance
is creating a conflict among different government bodies, it is considered a deep core belief
among policy makers and will be hard to change. Independent researchers should take the lead in
drafting regulatory policies and lobby policy makers for endorsement of such policies. Ideally,
the process should include compliant national organizations, international organizations,
independent research institutions, traditional media, new-generation media influencers, and
policy makers. The institutional conflict should be raised by the media to 1) get public support,
2) explain that the targeted changes will only affect the regulatory level not the decree itself, 3)
demonstrate that the lack of implementation is actually threatening the democratic process and
opening the window for foreign intervention, and finally, 4) show how the benefits of enforcing
the policy far outweigh potential downsides. Once public support is obtained, the draft policy
should be introduced to the Parliament by an elected official who support the amendments. This
process capitalizes on a window of opportunity, forming a coalition of advocates, and allow
passage of real reforms that will benefit the democracy, and Tunisian society as a whole. Doing
so, with the help of lessons from the Advocacy Coalition Framework, will not only result in the
endorsement of regulatory policies associated with Decree Number 88, it will also contribute to
the establishment of a new space for open policy debate in other areas.
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusion
This research is a comprehensive study of the contradictory impact of civil society
organizations on the Tunisian democratic transition. The unique strength of this study is that it
lies at the intersection of public policy and political science, not only contributing to academic
knowledge in the realm of political science, but also providing “real world” guidance for
Tunisian policy makers and CSO leaders. An ancillary benefit of this study is that it provides a
roadmap for the fruitful application of ACF to future studies involving other countries, as well as
providing a foundational analysis of the Tunisian political landscape that scholars may utilize in
comparative political research involving either Tunisia or other nascent democracies.
Civil society organizations in Tunisia played a critical role in consolidating the transition
to democracy. This central role gained international attention with the awarding of the 2015
Nobel Peace Prize to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, a group of four CSOs that
represent various interests in Tunisian society (Nobel Peace Prize, 2015). While the work of the
Quartet and other CSOs have had a positive impact on Tunisia’s democratization process and
helped to consolidate the democratic transition, the impact of civil society organizations is not
without problems. In fact, a large number of these organizations are currently jeopardizing the
process. Between the lack of transparency on the part of the CSOs and the lack of implementing
the law by government institutions, few of these organizations publish their financial reports and
share their activities with the public as required by the law. Other problems include using funds
to promote specific political parties or other illegal activities – in some cases linked to terrorism
(Ltif, 2020).
One of the main goals of this dissertation is to examine the frequently overlooked
negative implications of CSOs on Tunisia’s progress toward democratic consolidation and to
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identify the source of problems. This was done through an analysis of the efficacy of Decree
Number 88 of 2011, the law established to regulate civil society organizations, and an evaluation
of its effectiveness. The initial findings provide an explanation for the strong presence of civil
society organizations as well as the post-revolution legislation that enables CSOs to thrive. The
Tunisian context is unique to the region precisely because CSOs enjoyed a significant amount of
flexibility to operate under the authoritarian regimes of Habib Bourgiba and Zine al Abidine Ben
Ali. Because of this, many CSOs worked “within the system” to achieve non-political goals.
Therefore, even under the authoritarian rule that existed prior to the Arab Spring revolutions, the
presence of organizations that conducted civic activism laid the groundwork that would
ultimately lead to the creation of thousands of new organizations after the revolution, once
Tunisia’s democratic transition had occurred.
To evaluate civil society organizations and understand the relative success of the
Tunisian revolution, this study examines the evolution of CSOs in Tunisia and evaluates its
relationship to democracy. Previous research done by scholars such as Azmi Bchara (2012) and
Shelly Deane (2013) indicate that the Arab Spring is imitating post-cold war democratization
movements, where the presence of civic engagement had a major impact of democratic
consolidation. I build on this earlier work by examining previous democratization literature,
exploring the history of civil society in Tunisia, assessing the links between civil society and
democratization, and providing a deep analysis of the reasons behind the contradictory functions
of civil society organizations in Tunisia.
Policy makers, who were in charge of drafting transitional legislations, focused on
creating progressive decrees that adhere to international norms and failed to assess the capacity
of existing institutions and to evaluate their compatibility with the new legislation. Even though
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the number of organizations before 2011 was large, the government was able to monitor them
adequately. This is because CSOs were under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, which was
considered the strongest institution under the Ben Ali regime, and which still holds considerable
administrative capacity. When Parliament voted to switch the jurisdictional control of Decree
Number 88 from the Ministry of the Interior to the Prime Ministry, the step was celebrated as a
victory for civil liberties; however, this change failed to live up to expectations. The executive
control of civil society oversight by the Prime Minister’s office proved to be unsuccessful in
establishing a sustainable monitoring mechanism to replace the work previously done by the
Ministry of Interior.
With the creation of more than 15,000 new organizations and the millions of dollars that
were funneled through them, successive governments lost control of CSOs, particularly the
ability to track funding sources, while policy makers failed to understand the exact challenges
facing the Prime Ministry in the monitoring process. The first elected government established the
Ministry of Relations of Constitutional Bodies, Civil Society, and Human Rights hoping to
create some balance between the separate but occasionally overlapping organizations of the
Ministry of Finance, the Prime Ministry, and the Administrative Court. This switch and the
commensurate rebalancing of ministerial power was intended to and recover the government’s
control over rogue organizations. Rather than relying on career bureaucrats, the new institution
was primarily headed by political appointees who either failed to understand the exact challenge,
did not have the political will to implement new policies, or lacked sufficient time in office to
implement tangible changes.
This research is one of the few public policy studies conducted about civil society
organizations in Tunisia after the revolution. It analyzed the contradictory role CSOs are playing
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on the democratic transitions and explains the reasons behind the stasis of the legislations
associated with it. It presents the historical background of CSOs in Tunisia, goes through the
democratization literature, evaluates the positive and negative impact of CSOs on post-revolution
countries, studies the legislations regulating CSOs, stipulates a clear mapping to existing
problems, and provide specific recommendations. The findings can be summarized in the
following points:
1. CSOs in Tunisia are playing a contradictory role on the democratization process;
2. The problems associated with CSOs are not the result of legislative failure only,
rather the shortcomings represent a combination of institutional challenges,
political divisions, and lack of any decisive mechanism for implementation; and
3. Any attempts to eradicate the negative externalities of Decree Number 88 should
focus on improving oversight on CSOs and increasing overall implementation
efficiency for the existing decree, while avoiding any real or potentially perceived
erosion of the Decree, which would alienate large constituencies and delegitimize
what remains of the government’s ability to provide oversight of civil society.

My data reveal that policy makers who were tasked with fixing the problems associated
with CSOs focused mainly on the superficial level problems, and failed to identify the deeper
difficulties. In short, legislators focused on negative symptoms (for instance, low level
corruption or money smuggling) while leaving untouched the greater structural problems that led
to the symptoms, such as non-compliance with financial reporting rules.
Several policy makers connected the reform process to the war on corruption and based on
this extrajudicial determination, dissolved multiple civil society organizations without going

126

through the court system for judgment. In addition to being a direct violation of Decree Number
88, the arguably graver consequence of this action is that it undermined civilian confidence in the
system, and exacerbated suspicions regarding possible ill-intent on the government’s part. In
another deleterious strategy to bring CSOs into compliance, other legislators chose to attack the
problem by getting rid of the current regulatory framework regulating CSOs, and sought to
create a replacement for Decree Number 88. Both approaches incited institutional conflict that
put certain civic freedoms in jeopardy, while deepening the issues associated with civil society.
The interview process for this research started in 2016 and focused on the implications of
civil society organizations on the ongoing democratic transition. Using a grounded theory-based
methodology, the data reveal that even though participants agreed that CSOs are having a
positive impact on the Tunisian democratic process, they also stated that there are significant
negative factors associated with civil society. The contradictory functions of civil society
organizations on the Tunisian democratic process are the core theory of this dissertation. The
interview process aimed to analyze participants’ understanding of the issues accompanied with
civil society and evaluate the impact of the legislation regulating CSOs. Another qualitative
section of this dissertation tracked public statement of policy makers, who have a direct impact
on CSOs, and concluded that many were either unaware of specific problems that plague the
CSO regulatory regime, such as the exact role of the Ministry of Finance, while others focused
their attention on a futile a top-down approach that consists of replacing Decree Number 88. On
one example of the latter, Mr. Mahdi Ben Gharbia vowed in multiple public statements that his
team was working on a new law to completely replace Decree Number 88 and establish new
monitoring standards. Provoking much criticism due to the widespread perception that
overturning Decree Number 88 was a direct challenge to CSOs – and therefore, a direct
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challenge to democracy – Mr. Ben Gharbia’s loss of political capital over this unpopular stance
led him to resigning before being able to introduce new regulatory legislation for CSOs.
Following this, Mr. Ben Gharbia later acknowledged the complexity of the CSOs challenge.
The qualitative section of the dissertation reveals that most participants, many of whom
are members of civil society organizations, consider Decree Number 88 as the shield protecting
CSOs from the control of the government. Whether participants had a deep or a superficial
understanding of the Decree itself, and regardless of whether the organizations they lead or are
associated with happen to be compliant or non-compliant CSOs, all share the belief that
transitional decrees are the backbone of Tunisian democracy and any alteration or change to
these decrees is considered a loss to the existing freedoms. Even the CSO members who express
the belief that an absence of any clear implementation mechanism for CSO oversight is or may
be harmful are reluctant to support changing (let alone eliminating) Decree Number 88. Instead,
these CSO members and leaders indicated that the absence of a strong institution tasked with
monitoring CSOs’ work and finances will hinder efforts to solve the negative issues associated
with CSOs. The qualitative portion of the research helped generate the main hypotheses, and also
led to the central academic contribution of this dissertation: that civil society organizations in
Tunisia, whether intentionally or not, are having a contradictory impact on the ongoing
democratic process.
This research sheds light on how a successful democratic transition is not a finish line;
there is still a need to study public policy for new democracies to continue moving in a positive
direction. Viable civil society, as an example, is not free of obstacles; the ability to use
democratic freedoms toward corrupt ends is inherent in any democratic system, a fact that
underscores the need for legislators to have enough knowledge in the theory and practice of
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public policy to be able to deal with such difficulties. Toward this end, Advocacy Coalition
Framework provides both a useful lens for understanding the contradictory role of civil society
organizations and a fruitful tool for remedying current problems.
Along this vein, my dissertation evaluates the various effects of CSO policy stability on
the current democratic transition and proposes a path for effective policy change. The transitional
decrees that were established in 2011 freed civil society organizations and political parties from
the restrictions imposed by the previous authoritarian regime, and guided the country to its first
democratic election. With this history, many politicians and lay citizens alike consider these
decrees to be the outcome of revolution, and epitomize them as the cornerstone of Tunisia’s
successful democratic experiment. As such, most Tunisians oppose changing Decree Number 88,
or any regulatory action that could possibly inhibit the free operation of Tunisian civil society.
Guided by insights garnered through the application of Advocacy Coalition Framework,
my research clarifies the fundamental nature of Tunisian legislation that regulates civil society
organizations and proposes concrete ways that the policy can be leveraged to expand the benefits
of a vibrant civil society while minimizing the negative externalities that can undermine
democratic consolidation. ACF was developed to deal with public policy problems surrounded
by intense debate, which makes it the ideal framework for studying the Tunisian case (Hoppe
and Peterse, 1993). In addition, the flexibility of ACF renders the framework adaptable to the
research question at hand.
From revolution to the completion of the data set under analysis, which constitutes the
years of 2011–2020, Tunisia had eleven consecutive governments. 34 Several of the governments
recognized the problems associated with civil society organizations, although all of them failed

34

At time of publication, government instability has led to an additional two governments, bringing the total to 13
governments from the years 2011 to 2021.
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to introduce any tangible changes. The main cause of this failure is the absence of a
comprehensive understanding of the problems associated with CSOs and limited solution
strategies. ACF offers a useful tool for understanding Tunisia’s current political environment, for
instance, how and why CSO activity may be used to undermine the democratic institutional
achievements that civil society helped to establish in the first place. ACF also offers a useful tool
for conceptualizing a path to policy change via a coalition of government institutions and other
stakeholders that could create the conditions for passage of improved CSO regulatory policy.
Whether the focus was on following the recommendations of the European Union
Commission regarding money laundering and terrorism or finding an easy solution by attempting
to change the existing legislation, these efforts lacked an understanding of policy formulation
approaches and a genuine political will of change. These steps did not take into consideration the
importance of building a coalition, leading to the exclusion of certain members of CSOs from the
decision-making process. A significant finding that emerged from conducting a stakeholder
analysis informed by Advocacy Coalition Framework is that the policy’s stasis is largely
attributable to personal and institutional interests, not efficacy of the legislation. In other words,
stasis is preserved not because Decree Number 88 has produced excellent results; conversely,
stasis in this case is a result of a political equilibrium forged by stakeholders, such as ruling
political parties and individual political elites, who benefit from the law and do not wish to see
changes that would diminish their individual power, nor the future political prospects of their
parties.
The existing policy stability is not only affecting civil society organizations and their
functions in Tunisia negatively, but also creating a major institutional conflict. Decree Number
88 tasked different institutions with specific responsibilities, that if implemented effectively,
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would contribute to a clear monitoring mechanism. However, implementation according to the
language of Decree Number 88 has not occurred. For instance, Article 39, Part 2, of Decree
Number 88 charges the Ministry of Finance with the task of creating an “Accounting Standards
for Associations.” Once these accounting standards are established, then the Prime Ministry will
be in charge of auditing organizations and identifying non-compliant ones. The Ministry of
Finance never issued the official “Accounting Standards for Associations” in a strategic effort to
exploit the order of operations prescribed in Decree Number 88 in order to maintain power that
policymakers intended to strip from the Ministry of Finance. Essentially, the Finance Ministry
intentionally withheld – and continues to withhold to the present time – the Accounting
Standards, knowing that once it submits this mandated list, the power to identify non-compliant
organizations will be ceded to the Office of the Prime Minister. This has created a conflict
between the Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Relations with the Constitutional Instances, Civil
Society, and Human Rights, the Ministry of Finance, and the Administrative Court; more
importantly, the Finance Ministry’s withholding tactic has stymied the existing coordination
mechanism, and led to the inability of the government to implement this otherwise “good”
legislation.
In 2018, as a step toward removing Tunisia from the E.U.’s list of countries supporting
Money Laundering and Terrorism, the government added civil society organizations to its new
National Registry Law, officially named Law Number 30 of 2018, which requires organizations
to adhere to the same requirements as public and private enterprises. The new requirement was
immediately criticized by international organizations, which denounced it as a threat to the
democratic process in Tunisia (Freedom House, 2019). Critics of Law Number 30, both Tunisian
and international, stake their opposition to the law on two primary reasons: first, that many civil
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society organizations lack the capacity to comply with the new requirements, and second, that
the law was inappropriate for CSO regulation because it was crafted specifically for application
in the private sector.
The main legislative body in Tunisia is the Parliament, operating a semi-presidential
system with closed-list proportional representation. Since the endorsement of the 2014
constitution and the election of Tunisia’s first democratic government, no single political party
has won a majority, necessitating coalition-building and governance by consensus. Even where
Ennahdha, Tunisia’s largest political party, has won a comfortable plurality, compromise was
always required; since democratization, political and legislative decisions have always based on
a coalition between the winning parties, while issues such as such as economic development and
unemployment take the lead in the agenda setting process.
Despite clear benefits of Tunisia’s coalition governance, one drawback of Tunisia’s
legislative structure is that problems related to civil society organizations rarely make it onto the
Parliamentary agenda. When Parliament does address CSO activity at all, its attempts at reform
have proved too weak, and not compelling enough to produce change because the government’s
objective of not provoking criticism for stifling CSO activity overshadowed its motivation to
reform flaws in CSO oversight. In the case of Law Number 30 of 2018, the government
attempted a top-down approach to CSO financial reform by legislating stricter financial reporting
protocols to combat money laundering, however, expecting civil society organizations to adhere
to the law’s mandated legal constraints on their own proved futile. This approach rendered Law
Number 30 a failure: it was ineffective at its goal of compelling CSOs to comply with financial
oversight, and at the same time, it backfired by resulting in international criticism that Tunisia
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was experiencing democratic backsliding. For instance, Freedom House downgraded Tunisia’s
status from “Free” to “Partly Free” (Freedom House, 2019).
This research is not just theoretical but has practical application; it provides Tunisian
policy makers with a clear map to identify the existing problems and produce tangible changes
that will strengthen the role of civil society organizations in Tunisia. The issue of regulating civil
society organizations is going to be a challenge to Tunisian policy makers unless a different
governmental approach is implemented. This dissertation serves as a manual to policy makers to
identify the exact challenges facing CSOs, explain the contradictory functions of CSOs on the
democratization process, demonstrate the strengths and weakness of Decree Number 88, analyze
the implications of the current structure, and issue a list of policy recommendations that can help
produce concrete results. It will also address a gap in the literature in the study of civil society
and provide a new perspective using Advocacy Coalition Framework. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this
dissertation stand as convincing evidence that ACF is not only a methodological means of
understanding the problem, but provides a fruitful approach to crafting policy and supporting
implementation of existing CSO regulations in the case of Tunisia.
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